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PUTTING THE “MANDATORY” BACK IN 
THE MANDATORY DETENTION ACT 
MANI S. WALIA†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose a criminal defendant is found guilty of violating a 
serious federal law, like hostage taking, possessing child 
pornography, or first-degree murder, and is sentenced to multiple 
years’ imprisonment.1  Will he be detained during the period 
after conviction but before sentencing?  The Bail Reform Act 
establishes the procedure by which district courts determine 
whether a convicted person is eligible for bail pending sentencing 
or appeal.2  It provides that a person who is found guilty of 
certain serious offenses—crimes of violence, offenses with the 
maximum sentence of life in prison or death, or serious drug 
offenses—“and is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence be 
detained,” unless a sole exception applies.3
This Article’s position is straightforward:  Unless the 
convicted person satisfies that exception, he should be detained 
pending sentencing under the Bail Reform Act’s mandatory 
detention provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
   
4
 
† Mani Walia is an associate at Baker Botts, L.L.P. He previously served as a 
law clerk to the Honorable Jane R. Roth of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit and to the Honorable Hayden Head of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. He would like to thank his wife, Sabina, for 
her invaluable and cheerful support, insight, and editing on this—and all—writing 
projects. 
  An 
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006) (proscribing hostage taking); 18 U.S.C. § 2252 
(proscribing child pornography) (2006 & Supp. II); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (proscribing 
murder) (2006). 
2 See United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991).  
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) (emphasis added); DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 496. 
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). This provision, entitled “Release or detention 
pending sentencing or appeal,” provides as follows: 
(2) The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty 
of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of 
subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and is awaiting imposition or execution of 
sentence be detained unless— 
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uncontroverted reading of § 3143(a)(2) supports this conclusion.  
Moreover, the provision’s legislative history evinces 
congressional desire to “require the detention, in most cases, of a 
convicted criminal pending sentence[ing] or appeal[,] . . . allowing 
release only under very narrow circumstances.”5
But all eight United States Courts of Appeals that have 
analyzed this issue nevertheless take the position that the 
convicted person can escape detention during the period after 
conviction but before sentencing even though the mandatory 
detention provision applies—and its sole exception is not 
satisfied—if the district court finds “exceptional reasons.”
 
6  The 
“exceptional reasons” clause, however, is found in a section of a 
different federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), which is titled 
“Appeal from a release or detention order.”7
 
(A)  
  And 
(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a 
motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or  
(ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended that no 
sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and  
(B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 
community. 
Id. 
5 136 CONG. REC. 3465 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman). 
6 See United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (order 
reversing authorization of detention pending sentencing) (“[W]e hold that the 
district court erred in not considering whether Christman established exceptional 
reasons to support his release pending sentencing.”); United States v. Goforth, 546 
F.3d 712, 716 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that district courts may grant bail to 
convicted persons pending sentencing “under § 3145(c) when ‘exceptional reasons’ 
exist”); United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1014 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although 
the ‘exceptional reasons’ provision appears in a subsection that otherwise concerns 
actions taken by appellate courts, we agree with the other circuits to have addressed 
the issue that the district court has authority to determine whether there are 
exceptional reasons.”); United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); 
United States v. Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); 
DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 496; United States v. Carr, 947 F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir. 
1991) (per curiam) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘exceptional reasons’ language of § 3145 
may be applied by the judicial officer initially ordering such mandatory detention, 
despite its inclusion in a section generally covering appeals.”). From 2002 until 
March 2010, when it issued Christman, the Sixth Circuit had agreed with its sister 
circuits through an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Cook, 42 F. App’x 803, 
804 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (stating that district courts are “not precluded 
from making a determination of exceptional circumstances in support of release”). 
Incidentally, four of the eight published decisions were issued by the courts 
themselves as per curiam decisions.  
7 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (emphasis added). 
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18 U.S.C. § 1345(c)’s very first sentence explicitly limits its ambit 
to “[a]n appeal from a release or detention order . . . governed by 
the provisions of section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of [title 
18].”8  Both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 deal solely 
with appellate courts’ reviews of final orders from district courts.9
This Article contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) is confined 
under its plain language to use only by appellate courts in 
reviewing district courts’ bail orders.  In addition, the section’s 
legislative history unequivocally displays congressional desire to 
limit the application to appellate courts only:  Its sponsor noted 
that the “exceptional circumstances” clause applies “in the 
appeals setting.”
   
10  Indeed, some of the eight appellate courts 
concede that their approach allows district courts to use a clause 
contained with a statutory section pertaining to appeals.11  But 
they decided to sidestep that inconsistency, the section’s 
legislative history and, most importantly, the section’s plain 
language all in an effort to promote their view of fair results over 
fidelity to text or congressional intent.12
The eight courts of appeals do correctly identify the first 
statutory inquiry that a district court must undertake when a 
convicted person files a motion seeking bail pending  
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
   
13
 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
  Specifically, the first 
question is to evaluate whether the convicted person would  
be subject to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)’s mandatory-detention 
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3731;  see also United States v. Chen, 257 F. 
Supp. 2d 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3731 “relate solely to review of a final order of a district court by a court 
of appeals”). 
10 135 CONG. REC. S15,202 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) 
(emphasis added). 
11 See, e.g., Garcia, 340 F.3d at 1014 n.1 (acknowledging that its interpretation 
allows district courts to use a provision contained in a section that covers appeals); 
Carr, 947 F.2d at 1240 (same); cf. United States v. Cantrell, 888 F. Supp. 1055, 1056 
(D. Nev. 1995) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) “on its face” appears “to allow only 
appellate courts to make the determination whether ‘exceptional reasons’ make 
detention inappropriate”). 
12 See United States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 648, 652 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (stating 
that the courts of appeals’ decisions “ignore certain fundamental principles of 
statutory interpretation”).  
13 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 805 (10th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam) (noting that the district court properly analyzed § 3143(a)(2)’s exceptions 
before denying bail to the criminal). 
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provision,14 which requires that convicted persons who plead or 
are found guilty of certain crimes be presumed to be mandatorily 
detained while awaiting sentencing.15  The convicted person 
would be able to argue a single, two-part exception because 
§ 3143(a)(2) allows district courts to decline to mandatorily 
detain the criminal if (1) the court finds that there is a 
substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will 
be granted, or the government has recommended that no 
sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and (2) the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 
not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 
community.16
Yet after the eight courts of appeals correctly identify the 
statutory inquiry in § 3143(a)(2), they incorrectly inject a second 
statutory inquiry to circumvent § 3143(a)(2)’s mandate:  They 
allow district courts to evaluate whether “exceptional reasons” 
exist under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  Thus, district courts in those 
eight circuits may allow convicted persons to avoid detention 
after conviction but before sentencing or appeal if “exceptional 
reasons” are established.  This is so despite the language of 
§ 3143(a)(2) that compels detention.
  If the convicted person cannot establish that 
exception, he is required, under § 3143(a)’s clear mandate, to be 
detained until the district court can sentence him. 
17  Not surprisingly, many 
convicted persons are filing motions seeking release until 
sentencing under § 3145(c)—§ 3143(a)(2) notwithstanding.18  And 
many district courts are granting them.19
 
14 See Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (“There is no dispute that [§] 3143 of Title 18 
governs the question of release in the first instance.”). 
   
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).  
16 See id. 
17 United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that a 
district court could use 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) even though “the language of section 
3142(b)(2) compels detention”). Section 3143(b)(2) governs the procedure by which 
district courts decide whether to grant bail to a criminal pending his appeal. The 
difference between (a)(2) and (b)(2) is that the former governs the discretion that 
judicial officers have in granting release pending sentencing while the latter governs 
that discretion pending appeal. Section 3145(c) applies to appellate review of orders 
under either. See United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1015 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Section 3145(c) . . . applies to defendants seeking release pending sentencing as 
well as to those seeking release pending appeal. The legal principles . . . are equally 
applicable in both circumstances.”).  
18 See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 935 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(stating that defendant moved for release pending sentencing under 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) even though § 3143(a)(2) applied); United States v. Smith, 593 F. 
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This Article’s disagreement with the courts is over a serious 
issue.  Granting bail to a person convicted of one of these three 
serious crimes could lead to him harming an individual in the 
community.20
 
Supp. 2d 948, 950 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“Despite [§ 3143(a)(2)’s] mandate, Smith moved 
for continued release pending sentencing.”); United States v. Briggs, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
435, 436 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that, although § 3143(a)(2) “require[d]” detention 
“pending sentencing,” defendant moved for release pending sentencing under 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)); United States v. Miller, 568 F. Supp. 2d 764, 766 (E.D. Ky. 
2008) (“Miller was remanded to custody pursuant to the provisions of 
18 U.S.C. . . . § 3143(a)(2). He has now filed a motion seeking to be released from 
custody for ‘exceptional reasons’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).”); United States v. 
Mellies, 496 F. Supp. 2d 930, 931 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (stating that Mellies moved for 
release pending sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), arguing among other things, 
that his recent dental implants constituted “exceptional reasons”); United States v. 
Harrison, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (stating that Harrison filed a 
motion urging release from custody pending sentencing based on § 3145(c) even 
though § 3143(a)(2) applied); Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (stating that defendant 
asked that his bail be continued pending sentencing); United States v. Green, 250 F. 
Supp. 2d 1145, 1148–49 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“Under § 3145(c), this Court may release 
Defendant pending sentencing only upon a clear showing that an ‘exceptional 
reason’ makes Defendant’s further detention inappropriate.” (footnote omitted)); 
United States v. Kaquatosh, 252 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776–77 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (stating 
that defendant moved for release pending sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) even 
though § 3143(a)(2) applied); United States v. Cantrell, 888 F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (D. 
Nev. 1995) (“Although Cantrell apparently concedes [that § 3143(a)(2) applies], he 
argues he should remain on release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) . . . .”); United 
States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 648, 650 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that defendant 
moved for release under § 3145(c), even though “the express terms of § 3143(a)” 
applied); United States v. Bloomer, 791 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Vt. 1992) 
(“Notwithstanding the criteria . . . set forth in § 3143(a)(2)(A)–(B), defendant argues 
that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) compels his release.”). 
  And equally important, the appellate courts’ 
19 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483 (W.D.N.C. 2008) 
(“The Court further finds that ‘exceptional reasons’ exist in the instant case.”); 
United States v. Mitchell, 358 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708–09 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (granting 
bail to a convicted person awaiting sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) because 
exceptional reasons existed); United States v. Kaquatosh, 252 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779–
80 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (same); United States v. Charger, 918 F. Supp. 301, 303–04 
(D.S.D. 1996) (finding “exceptional reasons” because defendant’s family, rather than 
prison, would be the best environment to aid in his rehabilitation before sentencing); 
Cantrell, 888 F. Supp. at 1057–58 (finding “exceptional reasons” because defendant 
had been participating in a substance-abuse program and would benefit more from 
outpatient treatment than from detention). For the full discussion on district courts 
granting bail under § 3145(c), see infra Part V.C. 
20 Cf. Teenage “Monster” Raped Girl, Nine[,] While on Bail for Sexually 
Assaulting 10-year-old, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1245986/Teenage-monster-raped-girl-bail-
sexually-assaulting-10-year-old.html (discussing a defendant’s criminal acts 
committed while on bail pending trial in England); Richard Edwards, One Fifth of 
Murder Suspects “Committed Crime While on Bail,” TELEGRAPH ONLINE (Mar. 23, 
2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1582527/One-fifth-of-murder-
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interpretation of § 3145(c) arms district courts with broad 
discretion to release a person convicted of a serious crime 
pending sentencing, even though Congress confined use of that 
statute to courts of appeals only.  Simply put, the eight appellate 
courts’ grants of broad discretion to district courts are not 
tethered to any statutory authority.  The courts themselves have 
legislated over Congress, which enacted text to curtail district 
courts’ discretion and expanded the discretion that district courts 
to release convicted persons pending sentencing.  Federal courts 
may not act as legislative bodies by amending laws or applying 
laws selectively.21  Instead, they must comport with separation-
of-powers principles and apply unambiguous statutory language 
even if they disagree with it.22
Therefore, when presented with the opportunity, the 
remaining courts of appeals—the First, Third, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits—should confine the application of § 3145(c) to 
federal appellate courts only.  Moreover, the eight courts of 
appeals should overrule their jurisprudence to adhere to the 
section’s proper interpretation.  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court, if it elects to decide this matter authoritatively, should 
confine § 3145(c)’s ambit to federal appellate courts.   
  District courts should not be 
applying a statute that Congress wrote exclusively for courts of 
appeals.  
Part I explains the current statutory framework.  Part II, 
details Congress’s motivation to enact the two Bail Reform Acts, 
details the Acts’ histories, and explains their provisions.  Next, 
Part III delineates the statutory-interpretation principles that 
courts must follow to determine what § 3143(a)(2) and § 3145(c) 
provide.  Part IV argues why courts should reserve § 3145(c)  
 
 
 
suspects-committed-crime-while-on-bail.html (“Almost one in five murder suspects 
in Britain last year were alleged to have committed the offence while on bail . . . .”). 
21 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial 
decree.” (citations omitted)).  
22 See Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 664 n.30. The court noted that it found 
exceptional reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) if it “were deciding on release versus 
detention without the benefit of statutory guidance . . . . But [it] cannot decide this 
issue as if there is no controlling law. There is, and [it is] bound by the rule of law.” 
Id. (emphasis added).  
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exclusively for courts of appeals.  And finally, Part V presents the 
analysis of the appellate courts and district courts that have 
weighed in on the issue and addresses counterarguments.   
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 conditions a convicted 
person’s eligibility for release pending sentencing or appeal on 
18 U.S.C. § 3143.23
Section 3143 segregates between two categories of crimes to 
determine eligibility for release pending sentencing or appeal: 
those listed in § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), and (C)—which are crimes of 
violence, offenses with the maximum sentence of life in prison or 
death, or drug offenses
  Section 3143, in turn, delineates the process 
by which a convicted person may obtain release pending 
sentencing or appeal.   
24—and those crimes not listed in those 
subsections.25  Throughout, § 3143, though, for persons convicted 
of either category of crime, the district court “presumes that 
detention is valid, and the defendant bears the burden of 
overcoming that presumption and proving that release is 
appropriate.”26
Section 3143(a)(1) applies to the group of criminals who are 
not convicted of crimes listed in § 3142(f)(1).  For these criminals, 
if the sentence is imprisonment, the judicial officer must detain 
the criminal pending sentencing unless she finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the criminal “is not likely to flee or pose 
a danger to the safety of another person or the community if 
released.”
 
27
Section 3143(a)(2) applies to criminals convicted of crimes of 
violence, offenses with the maximum sentence of life in prison or 
death, or drug offenses.
   
28
 
23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). 
  For these criminals, the judicial officer 
24 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(C) (2006); see United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 
494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991). 
25 See DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 496 (“[Section 3143] distinguishes between two 
categories of crimes to determine eligibility for release.”); see also Jonathan S. Rosen, 
An Examination of the “Exceptional Reasons” Jurisprudence of the Mandatory 
Detention Act: Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143, 3145(c), 19 VT. L. REV. 19, 23 (1994) 
(describing § 3143 as applying to two categories of crimes). 
26 United States v. Hooks, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2004). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). 
28 Id. § 3143(a)(2) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(C), 
which identifies the relevant crimes). “Crime of violence” means an offense for which 
a required element of proof is the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
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must “detain” the individual pending sentencing unless she finds 
that: (1) a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or 
new trial will be granted, or an attorney for the government has 
recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on 
the person; and (2) by clear and convincing evidence, the person 
is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 
community.29
Thus, both § 3143(a)(1) and (a)(2) follow the same general 
rule, namely, the convicted person must be detained unless the 
statutory exception applies.  The difference lies in additional 
burdens placed on the person convicted under a § 3143(a)(2) 
crime to invoke the exception.  The exception for § 3142(f)(1)(A), 
(B), or (C) convicted persons is tougher for the convicted person 
to achieve because of its additional requirements.
   
30
By contrast, § 3143(b), which deals with bail pending 
appeals, provides an exception only for the non-section 
3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C) convicted persons. 
   
Section 3143(b) distinguishes between the same two classes 
of convicted persons in the appeals setting.  For the non-section 
3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C) convicted persons seeking release 
pending an appeal filed by them, § 3143(b)(1) provides as follows:  
[T]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been 
found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for writ 
of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds— 
(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 
person or the community if released under section 3142(b) 
or (c) of this title; and  
(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises 
a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in— 
 
force against the person or property of another or a felony that involves a substantial 
risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense. See 
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4); DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 496. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).  
30 See United States v. Wright, No. 2:07-CR-46 TS, 2009 WL 87604, at *1 (D. 
Utah Jan. 12, 2009) (stating that a person convicted of a crime specified in 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) faces “heightened burdens” to earn bail pending sentencing 
compared to a person convicted of a crime not specified in that section); see also 
United States v. Bloomer, 967 F.2d 761, 762 (2d Cir. 1992) (“18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) 
provides that persons ‘found guilty’ of offenses described in subparagraphs (A), (B), 
or (C) of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) and ‘awaiting imposition or execution of sentence’ 
shall be detained unless two conditions are met.”).  
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(i) reversal, 
(ii) an order for a new trial, 
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of 
imprisonment,  
(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less 
than the total of the time already served plus the 
expected duration of the appeal process.31
This section works like § 3143(a)(1) and (a)(2)—the general 
rule is detention and an exception exists.   
 
Section 3143(b)(2), which applies to § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or 
(C) convicted persons seeking release pending their appeal, 
departs in operation from the other three subsections described.  
It provides no exceptions.  Section 3143(b)(2) states bluntly that  
[t]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been 
found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph 
(A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a 
petition for writ of certiorari, be detained.32
Thus, a § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C) convicted person may not seek 
release pending his appeal—he will be detained categorically.   
   
Section 3145(c) enters the framework, according to the eight 
appellate courts, at this point.  It provides as follows: 
(c) Appeal from a release or detention order.—An appeal from a 
release or detention order, or from a decision denying revocation 
or amendment of such an order, is governed by the provisions of  
section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title.  The appeal 
shall be determined promptly.  A person subject to detention 
pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), and who meets the 
conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may 
be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the 
judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional 
reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.33
The eight appellate courts allow district courts to use this 
section in assessing whether to grant bail to a convicted person 
pending sentencing.  
 
But everything about § 3145(c) pertains to an appeal of the 
underlying bail order, which makes the proposition that district 
courts may apply it during their initial analysis of whether to 
 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1).  
32 Id. § 3143(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
33 Id. § 3145(c) (emphasis added).  
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grant bail untenable.34  First, the section itself confines its 
application to an “[a]ppeal from a” bail order.  Second, the 
statute’s first two sentences confine its application to appeals.  
And third, the section’s legislative history reveals that both 
leading legislators who introduced the last sentence of 
§ 3145(c)—the disputed sentence that contains the exceptional 
reasons provision—intended to confine that last sentence to 
apply only in the appeals setting:  “In the appeals setting, the 
convicted criminal could only be released if the attorney for the 
government files a motion indicating there are exceptional 
circumstances which warrant release and the defendant is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the community.”35
Similarly, § 3145’s two other subsections pertain to the 
review of the underlying order—not the determination in which a 
district court reaches its conclusion in the underlying order.  
First, subsection (a) deals with the district court’s ability to 
review an order of release issued by a magistrate judge, “or by a 
person other than a judge of court having original jurisdiction of 
the offense and other than a Federal appellate court.”
  Ultimately, 
§ 3145(c)’s ratified language completely reflected this 
congressional desire.  Accordingly, and as demonstrated herein, 
§ 3145(c) should apply only during appellate review of a district 
court’s order denying bail.   
36  
Presumably, the clause means that if a magistrate judge or a 
sister district court issues an order of release, a movant can seek 
review of that order with the district court in which the case was 
filed.37  The “motion” seeking review of the release order—which 
either the government or the individual seeking an amendment 
to the release order can file—“shall be determined promptly.”38
 
34 See United States v. Bloomer, 791 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Vt. 1992) (“[W]e think 
that § 3145(c) by its very provisions applies exclusively to reviewing courts and not 
to the court which initially ordered release or detention . . . .”).  
  
Likewise, subsection (b) deals with a district court’s ability to 
review a detention order issued by a tribunal other than the 
35 136 CONG. REC. 3466 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); (statement of Rep. 
Glickman) (emphasis added); accord 135 CONG. REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of 
Sen. Simon).  
36 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a).  
37 See United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that, under this statute, the district judge to whom the case is originally assigned is 
the court having original jurisdiction over the offense).  
38 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). 
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district court in which the case was filed.39  The statutory 
framework on its face, even without resort to the legislative 
history, countenances the notion that § 3145 applies to reviews of 
the bail order—not the determination of the bail order in the first 
instance.40
If interpreted correctly, § 3145(c) enters the statutory 
framework only when a convicted person files an appeal.  At that 
point, during the appellate inquiry in § 3145(c), the appellate 
court can vacate the district court’s order denying bail pending 
sentencing made under § 3143(a)(2) if two requirements are met.  
First, the convicted person must satisfy the relaxed standard of 
 
 
39 See id. § 3145(b). 
40 A bill in Congress would add subsection (d) to 18 U.S.C. § 3145. In September 
2009, Senators Jon Kyl and John Cornyn sponsored the “USA PATRIOT 
Reauthorization and Additional Weapons Against Terrorism Act of 2009.” 155 CONG. 
REC. S9,934 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl). A bill before the 111th 
Congress would have added subsection (d) to 18 U.S.C. § 3145. In September 2009, 
Senators Jon Kyl and John Cornyn sponsored the “USA PATRIOT Reauthorization 
and Additional Weapons Against Terrorism Act of 2009.” 155 CONG. REC. S9,934 
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  But the bill did not make it out of 
Committee to which it was assigned, and it thus died.  See id.  The purpose of the 
bill is “to reauthorize the expiring intelligence tools of the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and defend against terrorism through 
improved classified procedures and criminal law reforms, and for other purposes.” 
Id. at S9,933. Title III of this proposed bill, entitled “Additional Government 
Weapons Against Terrorism Act of 2009,” would amend 18 U.S.C. § 3145 by adding 
subsection (d). Id. at S9,934. It would provide as follows: 
SEC. 305. PREVENTING UNWARRANTED RELEASE OF CONVICTED 
TERRORISTS AND SEX OFFENDERS PENDING SENTENCING OR 
APPEAL. 
(a) In General.—Section 3145 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
(d) Application.—No person shall be eligible for release under 
subsection (c) based on exceptional reasons if the person is being 
detained pending sentencing or appeal in a case involving— 
(1) an offense under section 2332b of this title; 
(2) an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of this title for which 
a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is 
prescribed; or 
(3) an offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, 1591, 
2241, 2242, 2244(a)(1), 2245, 2251, 2251A, 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 
2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(3), 2252A(a)(4), 
2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425 of this title.  
Id. at S9,936. The section thus eviscerates courts’ discretion in using the 
“exceptional reasons” provision in cases involving convicted terrorists and sex 
offenders. These two members of Congress are attempting, once again, to curtail 
courts’ discretion, comporting with the arc of legislative history, by preventing 
federal appellate courts from using the amorphous “exceptional reasons” exception 
in cases involving persons convicted of utmost serious crimes. 
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§ 3143(a)(1)—namely, that he is not likely to flee and will not 
pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community.41  And second, the appellate court must find 
“exceptional reasons.”42  The same holds true for a convicted 
person challenging a district court’s decision to deny him bail 
pending his appeal:  During the appellate inquiry, the court can 
vacate the district court’s order made under § 3143(b)(2) if the 
convicted person satisfies the relaxed standard in § 3143(b)(1) 
and the appellate court finds “exceptional reasons.”43  As 
evidenced by its plain language, § 3145(c) does not allow district 
courts to use the “exceptional reasons” language when 
determining if a convicted person may receive bail pending 
sentencing or appeal.44
Referring to the § 3145’s legislative history and the earlier 
Acts of 1966 and 1984 that governed bail makes this notion—its 
applicability only to courts of appeals—clear.  
   
II. THE BAIL REFORM ACTS AND THEIR IMPETUSES 
Congress has crafted legislation three times—in 1966, 1984, 
and 1990—concerning the federal courts and bail.  Notably, each 
enactment added different tests to different classes of criminals.  
For instance, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, which governed 
bail orders until 1966, Congress provided rules governing only 
bail decisions for defendants in the interim between indictment 
 
41 See United States v. Sabhnani, 529 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(noting that § 3143(a)(1) provides “a less stringent test than the one that applies to 
individuals who have been convicted of violent crimes” under § 3143(a)(2)). 
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). The definition of “exceptional reasons” has eluded a 
uniform definition. See generally Rosen, supra note 25, at 25–34 (documenting the 
varying judicial definitions). This is so because “[s]ection 3145(c) does not define the 
term ‘exceptional reasons.’ ” United States v. Briggs, 577 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 
(D.D.C. 2008). As such, courts have been attempting to define it. “[C]ourts have 
generally read the phrase to mean circumstances that are ‘clearly out of the 
ordinary, uncommon, or rare.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d 561, 563 
(9th Cir. 1993) (Rymer, J., concurring)); see United States v. Larue, 478 F.3d 924, 
925–26 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that courts generally have defined the term as 
“circumstances that are ‘clearly out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare’ ”). 
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  
44 See United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Section 
3145(c) therefore governs appellate review of either: (i) a district court’s initial 
release or detention order made pursuant to section 3143, or (ii) a district court’s 
order, made pursuant to section 3145(a) or (b), reviewing another court’s release or 
detention order.” (emphasis added)).  
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and trial.45  By 1984, Congress had provided rules governing 
defendants, convicted persons presentencing—during the period 
between conviction and sentencing—and convicted persons post-
sentencing—during the period between sentencing and appeal.46
Importantly, each enactment individually evidenced 
congressional desire to limit the federal courts’ ability to grant 
bail.  And the cumulative arc of federal legislation governing bail 
reveals that Congress has slowly been enervating courts’ 
discretion to grant bail since 1966.  The conclusion, then, from 
the eight courts of appeals to inject wide discretion to district 
courts is untenable. 
 
A. Colonial America Until 1966 
In colonial America, bail law was patterned after English 
law.47  The law governing bail simply prohibited excessive bail.48  
The English excessive bail clause was intended to remedy 
judicial abuses in denying bail to specific prisoners.49  After years 
of this practice, English lawmakers were fed up, accusing the 
King of attempting “to subvert . . . the laws and liberties of the 
kingdom . . . [in that] excessive bail hath been required of 
persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the 
laws made for the liberty of the Subjects.”50  The English Bill of 
Rights thus corrected this situation by declaring that “excessive 
bail ought not to be required.”51
 
45 See infra notes 
 
59–61 and accompanying text.  
46 See infra Part II.C.  
47 See generally Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (1965) (noting that the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, North 
Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts colonies incorporated bail provisions 
stemming from English law). 
48 See id.  
49 See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1327–28 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) 
(stating that the English Bill of Rights sought to close a loophole in the English bail 
system by restricting the discretion of local justices in setting bail for offenses 
otherwise deemed bailable). See generally William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A 
Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 66 (1977) (concluding that Parliament 
enacted this provision in the English Bill of Rights to proscribe the injustice of 
selectively imposing excessive bail); Hermine H. Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial 
Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139, 1189–90 (1972) (same).  
50 Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., 2d Sess., ch. 2, § 10, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441 
(Eng.). 
51 Id. 
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When the colonies became independent in 1776, they enacted 
specific bail laws that mirrored the English rule.52  Virginia’s 
rule, penned by George Mason,53 declared shortly that “excessive 
bail ought not to be required.”54
When James Madison prepared an initial draft of the Bill of 
Rights in 1789,
 
55 which passed Congress in 1789 and was ratified 
in 1791, he looked to the Virginia Constitution as the model.56  
Indeed, the Eighth Amendment in this Bill of Rights was taken 
virtually verbatim from Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution, 
which was taken, in turn, from the English Bill of Rights.57  It 
provided that “Excessive bail shall not be required.”58  
Representative Livermore uttered the sole comment about this 
clause during the congressional debates:  “[The clause] seems to 
have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.  What is 
meant by the term excessive Bail?”59
While, the Constitution prohibits judges from levying 
excessive bail.
  
60
 
52 See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1328 (“When the colonies asserted their 
independence in 1776, they largely adopted the bail provisions from their colonial 
charters into their state constitutions.”).   
  It does not provide any rules about bailable 
offenses or the different standards of granting bail to defendants 
before trial or convicted persons after conviction but before 
53 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983) (stating that George Mason 
authored the Virginia Declaration of Rights). 
54 VA. CONST. art. 1, § 9, reprinted in 9 W. HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 111 
(1821).   
55 See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (Birch, J., 
dissenting) (noting that James Madison prepared the initial draft of the Bill of 
Rights).  
56 See United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 459–60 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that 
the Virginia Constitution’s “importance as the source of the federal Bill of Rights 
may not be overemphasized” and that “[e]very specific guarantee in the Virginia 
proposal, save one, later found a place in the federal Bill of Rights”).  
57 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
266 (1989) (“[I]t is clear that the Eighth Amendment was ‘based directly on Art. I, 
§ 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,’ which ‘adopted verbatim the language of 
the English Bill of Rights.’ ” (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 285 n.10)). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.   
59 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1330 
(D.C. 1981) (en banc) (“The historical origins of the excessive bail clause, as well as 
its narrow language, indicate that its primary purpose is to limit the judiciary.”). 
Incidentally, the Supreme Court has interpreted this Amendment to prohibit the 
imposition of excessive bail without creating a right to bail in criminal cases. See 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987) (stating that the Eighth 
Amendment does not grant absolute right to bail). 
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sentencing.  By contrast, the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed at the 
same time as the Bill of Rights, created substantive rules 
distinguishing bailable vis-à-vis nonbailable offenses for 
defendants facing criminal trials.61
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, 
except where the punishment may be by death, in which cases it 
shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or 
by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, 
who shall exercise their discretion therein regarding the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, and of the evidence and the 
usages of law.
  It provided that all 
defendants charged with noncapital crimes would receive bail 
and that, in capital cases, the decision to detain a defendant was 
to be left to the judge:  
62
Defendants thus had an absolute right to bail in all 
noncapital cases,
 
63
B. Bail Reform Act of 1966 
 and courts had total discretion in capital 
cases.  That changed in 1966.   
In 1966, Congress enacted the first major substantive change 
in federal bail law since 1789—the Bail Reform Act of 1966.64
The purpose of this Act [was] to revise the practices 
relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their 
financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their 
appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, 
when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public 
interest.
   
65
The Act treated defendants in noncapital cases differently 
than defendants in capital cases or criminals after conviction 
pending sentencing or appeal.  For defendants in noncapital 
cases, the Act stated that “any person charged with an 
offense . . . shall . . . be ordered released pending trial on his 
   
 
61 It did not, though, provide guidance on bail decisions to convicted persons. See 
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, 1 Stat. 91–92. 
62 Id. at 91.  
63 See Foote, supra note 47, at 971 (“Section 33 of the Judiciary Act extend[ed] 
an absolute right to bail in all noncapital federal criminal cases.”).  
64 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–51 (1966)), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976. The statutory references in this section are to the 1966 
Act unless otherwise indicated.  
65 Id. § 2. 
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personal recognizance” or on personal bond unless the judicial 
officer determines that these incentives will not adequately 
assure his appearance at trial.66  The 1966 Act thus created a 
presumption for releasing a suspect on bail before trial, with 
fleeing from trial as the sole touchstone for the bail decision.67
For defendants in capital cases or criminals post-conviction, 
the judge was authorized to weigh the risk of fleeing from trial 
and threats to community safety when determining bail.  The Act 
provided as follows:  
  
This departed from the Judiciary Act’s mandate that defendants 
in noncapital cases had an absolute right to bail.   
a person (1) who is charged with an offense punishable by 
death, or (2) who has been convicted of an offense and is either 
awaiting sentence or has filed an appeal . . . shall be treated in 
accordance with the provisions of section 3146 unless the court 
or judge has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of 
release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or 
pose a danger to any other person or to the community.68
For these two groups, though, the presumption remained 
that bail was appropriate.  Thus, for a convicted person seeking 
bail awaiting sentencing and a convicted person seeking bail 
pending an appeal, both of whom the Act treated the same, the 
court would presume to grant bail unless the individual would 
likely flee or pose a danger.   
 
After a short period of operating under the 1966 Act, 
Congress noticed problems with defendants in noncapital cases.  
When passing the 1966 Act, Congress conceded that it was not 
attempting to deal with evaluating defendants’ dangerousness 
during the bail inquiry.69
 
66 Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1966)).  
  The problems associated with the 1966 
67 See United States v. Cowper, 349 F. Supp. 560, 562 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (“The 
Bail Reform Act in 1966 re-emphasized that the purpose of any restrictions on 
release was to assure the presence of the accused at trial.”); Betsy Kushlan Wanger, 
Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise 
of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 320 n.3 (1987) (stating that under 
the 1966 Act, “pretrial detention in noncapital cases could be ordered solely to avoid 
defendant’s failure to appear at trial”). 
68 Bail Reform Act of 1966, § 3, 80 Stat. at 215–16 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1966)).   
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541, at 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 
2296, 1966 WL 4286 (acknowledging that the Act did not deal with “the problem of 
the preventative detention of the accused because of the possibility that his liberty 
might endanger the public” because that went “beyond the scope of the present 
CP_Walia (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:24 PM 
2011] MANDATORY DETENTION ACT 193 
Act were considered by the Judicial Council committee to study 
the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia 
in May 1969.70  The release of potentially dangerous noncapital 
defendants troubled the Committee, and it thus recommended 
that, even in noncapital cases, judges considers a person’s 
dangerousness before granting bail.71  Congress went along with 
the ideas put forth in the Committee’s proposals and changed the 
1966 Bail Reform Act as it applied to defendants charged with 
crimes in the District of Columbia by allowing judges to consider 
dangerousness to the community as well as risk of flight when 
setting bail in noncapital cases.72
Perhaps encouraged by the 1970 amendment applicable to 
the District of Columbia, Congress, in 1984, changed the bail 
rules for the federal system.   
  
C. Bail Reform Act of 1984 
Roughly twenty years later, “Congress enacted The 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, . . . legislation 
designed to address a broad spectrum of issues related to 
criminal prosecutions.”73
 
proposal”). See generally Kenneth Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 
EMORY L.J. 685, 686 (1985).  
  One part, sponsored by Senator Strom  
 
 
 
 
70 H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 87–94 (1970); see United States v. Edwards, 430 
A.2d 1321, 1341 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (stating that to evaluate the 1966 Act, 
“Congress considered (1) the alarming increase in street crime in the District of 
Columbia since 1966; (2) statistical studies involving recidivism by persons while on 
pretrial release; (3) recommendations by the President’s Commission on Crime in 
the District of Columbia (1966), and the Judicial Council Committee to Study the 
Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia (1969); and (4) pretrial 
release and detention practices in England and other countries”).  
71 See Judicial Council Committee To Study the Operation of the Bail Reform 
Act in the District of Columbia (1969), reprinted in Preventive Detention: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong. 703 (1970). 
72 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).   
73 See generally Barry Tarlow, Bail Pending Release: The Bail Reform Act, 
CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 68 (describing the 1984 Bail Reform Act’s purpose).  
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Thurmond,74 was the Bail Reform Act of 1984,75 which repealed 
the 1966 Bail Reform Act.  It “dramatically changed the bail 
system.”76
The 1984 Act’s overarching feature was its decision to 
reverse the presumption in favor of granting bail post-conviction 
and replace it with a presumption in favor of denying bail.
   
77  It 
also aimed to resolve the problem of the infliction of harm on 
innocent victims by defendants who have been released pending 
trial.78
The Act carefully distinguished how defendants vis-à-vis 
convicted persons should be treated.  For defendants, “[u]pon 
th[eir] first appearance before a judicial officer” after being 
“charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall” do one of four 
things: (1) release the suspect without conditions; (2) release him 
with conditions; (3) temporarily detain him; or (4) detain him 
prior to trial.
   
79
 
74 Bill Summary & Status—98th Congress (1983–1984)—S.215, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:SN00215:@@@L&summ2= 
m& (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
  The district court must conduct a detention 
hearing if the government requests the hearing, and the case 
75 Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006 & Supp. II)). 
76 135 CONG. REC. 27,711 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (discussing the 1984 
Act in his introduction of the 1990 Act); see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
742 (1987) (“Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as the solution to a 
bail crisis in the federal courts.” (citation omitted)). 
77 See United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22–23 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 was enacted because Congress wished to reverse the 
presumption in favor of bail that had been established under the prior statute, the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966.”); id. (“The basic distinction between the existing provision 
[from the 1966 Bail Act] and Section 3143 is one of presumption . . . . [T]he [1966] 
statute incorporates a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction. It is the 
presumption [in favor of granting bail] that the Committee wishes to eliminate . . . .” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 225-98 at 26 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3189)); see also United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d 561, 567 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress, through the 1984 Act, reversed the 
presumption to release that existed in the 1966 Act).  
78 See Koon, 6 F.3d at 567 (“We used to presume that defendants were entitled 
to bail pending appeal. The only reason Congress reversed this presumption in 1984 
was its concern for the danger many defendants present upon release.”); Berg, supra 
note 69, at 739 (stating that the Act’s proponents worried about defendants inflicting 
harm on victims pending trial).  
79 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203(a), 98 Stat at 176–77 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(1)–(4)). For a discussion about the controversial nature of 
temporarily detaining the suspect, see Berg, supra note 69, at 702–04.  
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involves one of the serious crimes listed in § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(D).80  
Those subsections include (A) “a crime of violence,” (B) “an 
offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or 
death,” (C) “an offense for which a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years is prescribed in the Controlled 
Substances Act,” and (D) any felony, when the suspect has “been 
convicted of two or more prior offenses [listed] in subsections (A) 
through (C).”81  At that hearing, the district court “shall order the 
detention of the person prior to trial” if no condition of release 
will “reasonably assure” his appearance at trial “and the safety of 
any other person and the community.”82
The 1984 Act differed from the 1966 Act to the detriment of 
defendants and convicted persons.  In the 1984 Act, Congress 
expanded the evaluation of dangerousness to three classes of 
defendants—those charged with a crime of violence, an offense 
for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death, 
or an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten 
years is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act.
  Thus, a defendant 
charged with one of the serious crimes listed in § 3142(f)(1)(A)–
(D) would be detained if he is a flight risk or presents a safety 
concern to another person or the community. 
83  Under 
the 1966 Act, by contrast, only in cases in which a defendant was 
charged with a capital crime was the district court permitted to 
weigh dangerousness to community safety.84
 
80 Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203(a), 98 Stat at 179 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). 
  And in those cases, 
the district courts began the inquiry by presuming bail was 
81 Id. 
82 § 203(a), 98 Stat at 178–79 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)) 
(emphasis added). The government has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of 
the community. See United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 1985). The standard is different 
when the issue is whether any conditions of release will reasonably assure the 
defendant’s attendance at trial. In that case, the government need only prove that 
there are no such conditions by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States 
v. Tedder, 903 F. Supp. 344, 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing United States v. Martir, 782 
F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
83 See § 203(a), 98 Stat at 179 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)); see 
also Rosen, supra note 25, at 21 n.17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(D) (2006 & 
Supp. I)). 
84 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1966), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
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appropriate.85  Under the 1984 Act, however, the three classes of 
previously mentioned defendants were presumed to be 
detained.86
For those convicted and awaiting sentencing, they were 
presumed to be detained unless they were not likely to flee or 
pose a danger to another person or the community. 
   
The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found 
guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution 
of sentence, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or 
pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community if released under section 3142 (b) or (c).  If the 
judicial officer makes such a finding, [such judicial officer] shall 
order the release of the person in accordance with section 3142 
(b) or (c).87
The 1984 Act demonstrated a coarsening of treatment to 
convicted persons.  Convicted persons seeking bail while awaiting 
sentencing were no longer presumed to receive bail as they were 
under the 1966 Act unless the court had reason to believe they 
were “not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 
person or the community.”
   
88  Instead, under the 1984 Act, 
defendants were presumed to be detained unless they could 
establish that they would not flee or pose a danger.89  The 1984 
Act was thus “an improvement from the old law in protecting the 
community from dangerous individuals and ensuring that 
defendants are accorded with procedural safeguards.”90
The 1984 Act also contained a separate rule for those 
convicted, sentenced, and seeking bail pending their appeal.  The 
Act treated convicted persons seeking bail while awaiting 
   
 
85 Id. Interestingly, neither this Act nor the 1966 Act allowed courts to evaluate 
whether the person would pose a danger to himself if released. 
86 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203(a), 98 Stat. at 178–79 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)).  
87 § 203(a), 98 Stat at 181 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006)). 
88 Id.  
89 See id.; United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22–23 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that 
the 1984 Act made detention the presumption). Moreover, the convicted person had 
the burden of proof to prove these requirements. See United States v. Affleck, 765 
F.2d 944, 953 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that in order to grant bail under the 1984 Act, 
“a court must find that the defendant has met his burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any 
other person or to the community if released”).  
90 135 CONG. REC. 27,711 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (summarizing the 
1984 Act in his introduction of the 1990 Act). 
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sentencing and convicted persons seeking bail pending appeals in 
different subsections with different rules, in contrast to the 1966 
Act, which lumped the two together.91
[t]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been 
found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for writ 
of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds— 
  Specifically, the 1984 Act 
provided that  
(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 
person or the community if released pursuant to section 
3142(b) or (c); and  
(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a 
substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal 
or an order for a new trial.92
D. Mandatory Detention Act of 1990 
 
Because of the proliferation of violent and drug-related 
crimes in the 1980s, Congress concluded that the 1984 Act did 
not go far enough in detaining dangerous criminals who awaited 
sentencing or appeal.93  Thus, in 1990, Congress diminished 
federal courts’ discretion on detention once again.94
 
91 United States v. Bloomer, 967 F.2d 761, 763 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The 1984 Act 
divided former section 3148 into two subsections, subsection 3143(a), concerning 
release ‘pending sentence,’ and subsection 3143(b), concerning release ‘pending 
appeal.’ ”).  
   
92 Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203, 98 Stat. at 1981–82 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), (b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)) (emphasis added). The 1984 Act also used the 
term “judicial officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) (2006). The Act incorporated the 
definition of “judicial officer,” which means 
[U]nless otherwise indicated, any person or court authorized pursuant to 
section 3041 of this title, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to 
detain or release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a 
court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia.  
Id. 
93 See Rosen, supra note 25, at 22. 
94 See United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Congress reversed the presumption to release in the 1984 
Act and then, in the 1990 Act, “tightened the requirements in 1990 out of a concern 
that a clear and convincing showing was not enough to protect society from violent 
criminals and serious drug offenders”); United States v. Green, 250 F. Supp. 2d 
1145, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“The intent of the bill was clearly to limit judicial 
discretion in the case of convicted drug traffickers or violent criminals.”).  
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In passing the “Mandatory Detention for Offenders 
Convicted of Serious Crimes Act,”95 Congress made earning bail 
pending sentencing or appeal even more elusive for three classes 
of convicted persons: convicts of crimes of violence, convicts of 
offenses with a maximum sentence of life in prison or death, and 
convicts of certain drug offenses with a maximum sentence of at 
least ten years in prison.96  Under the 1984 Act, these three 
classes of individuals were already presumed to be detained 
pending trial, sentencing, and appeal.97  But Congress wanted to 
make earning bail after conviction even tougher for these three 
classes.98
So these types of serious criminals were dealt with again in 
the three additions to the 1990 Act: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(2), the 
subsection about bail after conviction but before sentencing;
 
99 
(2) 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), the subsection about bail post-
sentencing but before appeal;100 and (3) the one sentence to 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), the subsection about an appeal or review of 
those orders—and the subsection at the center of the 
controversy.101
The legislative history reveals the drafters’ desire to make 
earning bail tougher.  In contrast to the Second Circuit’s 
frustration that the legislative history of § 3145 is “sparse and 
uninformative,”
 
102 the legislative history, which consists of 
comments made by Senator Paul Simon and Representative Dan 
Glickman, is rich and reveals Congress’s motivation.103
 
95 Mandatory Detention for Offenders Convicted of Serious Crimes Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-647, § 901, 104 Stat. 4826, 4926 (1990) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3143, 3145).  
  That is, 
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) 
(A)–(C) (2006 & Supp. II), which identifies the relevant crimes).  
97 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 203(a), 98 Stat. at 1976–82 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–43). 
98 See 136 CONG. REC. 3465–66 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
99 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(2).  
100 See id. § 3143(b)(2).  
101 Id. § 3145(c). 
102 United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1991); see United 
States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This is a case in which a 
plain reading of the statute offers little if any help. Moreover, not only does a 
reading of the statute not provide much assistance with regard to the meaning of 
‘exceptional reasons,’ the legislative history is also ‘sparse and uninformative.’ ” 
(quoting DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 497)).  
103 See 136 CONG. REC. 3465–66 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
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the Act’s legislative history evinces congressional desire to 
prevent courts from granting bail to persons convicted of serious 
crimes—which makes the eight appellate courts injection of wide 
discretion to district courts to grant bail to persons convicted of 
serious crimes untenable.   
Indeed, Senator Paul Simon, the Act’s sponsor, 
unambiguously noted that “[t]he primary purpose of this [A]ct is 
to prevent the release on bail of convicted drug traffickers or 
violent criminals who are awaiting sentencing or appeal.”104  This 
is the purpose because “there is little need for judicial discretion 
to release those who have been found guilty.”105  Senator Simon 
noted that, under the 1984 Bail Reform Act, “a judge ha[d] 
discretion to release a convicted defendant pending sentencing or 
appeal.”106  But, according to him, “[t]he purpose of this 
legislation is to close this loophole by narrowing the judicial 
officer’s discretion in cases where the defendant has been 
convicted of drug trafficking or violent crime.”107
Likewise, Representative Dan Glickman noted that the 
Mandatory Detention Act would “require the detention, in most 
cases, of a convicted criminal pending sentence or appeal.”
 
108  He 
acknowledged that “under [the 1984 Act], a judge ha[d] discretion 
to release a convicted criminal pending sentencing or appeal,” 
but that “[t]his bill would tighten that loophole considerably, 
allowing release only under very narrow circumstances.”109
Senator Simon’s and Representative Glickman’s forceful 
comments establish that narrowing—not expanding—judicial 
discretion was their motivation.
 
110
Senator Simon also explained the narrow exception that 
would exist if the Act passed.  He noted that, “[w]hile the 
intent . . . [was] to limit judicial discretion[,] . . . the Justice 
Department ha[d] recommended that in certain limited  
 
 
  
 
104 135 CONG. REC. 27,711 (1989) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. (emphasis added). 
108 136 CONG. REC. 3465 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman).  
109 Id. (emphasis added).  
110 See 136 CONG. REC. 3465–66 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
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circumstances the judicial officer should retain discretion.”111
[I]n the presentencing setting, if the attorney for the 
government will recommend a sentence of no incarceration or if 
the judicial officer finds that there is a substantial likelihood 
the defendant’s motion for [a] new trial or acquittal will be 
granted and the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger 
to the community, the judicial officer may release the 
defendant.
  
Senator Simon described the exception that would ultimately 
become codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(2):  
112
Neither Senator Simon’s nor Representative Glickman’s 
comments contained any suggestion of any other exception—
involving exceptional reasons or otherwise—for convicted persons 
presentencing.
 
113
When enacted, § 3143(a)(2) mirrored the two legislators’ 
comments by offering a single, narrow exception for convicted 
persons presentencing:  
   
(2) The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been 
found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph 
(A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and is awaiting 
imposition or execution of sentence be detained unless—  
(A)(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial 
likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be 
granted; or  
(ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended 
that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the 
person; and  
(B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any 
other person or the community.114
Senator Simon also commented about the proposal that 
would eventually become the last sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  
He noted that “in the appeals setting, if the attorney for the 
government files a motion indicating that there are exceptional 
circumstances which warrant release and the defendant is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the community, the judicial 
 
 
111 135 CONG. REC. 27,711 (1989) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
112 Id. at 27,711–12. 
113 See 136 CONG. REC. 3465–66 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
114 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) (2006).  
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officer may order release.”115  Representative Glickman, too, 
noted that the “exceptional circumstances” touchstone applied 
“[i]n the appeals setting,” without any suggestion of application 
in the district court setting.116
Senator Simon added the “exceptional reasons” provision 
after the Justice Department recommended it.
 
117  Senator Simon, 
then Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, had 
written to Assistant Attorney General Edward Dennis to request 
comments on the version of the Mandatory Detention Act that 
did not allow for any exceptions.118  It must be remembered that 
the proposal regarding bail pending a convicted person’s appeal 
contained no exception,119
The response, which came from Assistant Attorney General 
Carol Crawford, indicated that the Justice Department suggested 
that the bill would benefit from an exception for defendants who 
were not dangerous or a risk of flight and who raised a 
substantial issue on appeal.
 while the proposal on the subsection on 
bail pending sentencing did contain an exception. 
120
18 U.S.C. § 3143 currently provides that persons convicted, who 
are either awaiting sentence (if the applicable guideline calls for 
a sentence of imprisonment) or who have been sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment, be detained unless the judicial officer 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to the community and that the  
 
 
 
  The letter began by noting that  
 
115 135 CONG. REC. 27,712 (1989) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
116 136 CONG. REC. 3466 (1990) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep. Glickman). 
117 See United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (“The [‘exceptional reasons’] exception was first proposed by the 
Department of Justice, in a letter to Senator Simon which expressed general support 
for the Mandatory Detention Act but also expressed concern about its ‘mandatory 
nature.’ ” (quoting United States v. DiSomma, 769 F. Supp. 575, 577 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d, 951 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
118 See United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1018 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). 
119 When § 3143(b)(2) was ultimately enacted, it reflected the proposal’s no-
exception approach, which departed from § 3143(a)(2)’s inclusion of an exception. See 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) (2006); Koon, 6 F.3d at 567 (noting that “the harshness of 
section 3143(b)(2)[ ]” was its “blanket prohibition on release pending appeal in drug 
cases and cases involving crimes of violence”). 
120 See Garcia, 340 F.3d at 1018 n.4 (“The response, which came on July 26, 1989 
from Crawford, made clear that the Justice Department believed that the bill went 
too far and that an exception was needed for defendants who were not dangerous or 
a risk of flight, and who raised a substantial issue on appeal . . . .”). 
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appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result 
in a reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence other than 
imprisonment.121
Thus, the letter addressed only the Justice Department’s 
worries about the categorical nature of the proposed 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2)—the subsection on appeals by the 
convicted person.  Making its applicability to § 3143(b)(2) clear, 
the letter asserted that, “[u]nder section 2 . . . this provision 
would be modified so as to mandate detention . . . if the offense 
was a crime of violence [or] a controlled substance 
offense . . . that carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment 
or death.”
 
122  Though the Justice Department expressed “support 
[for] the thrust of section 2 to strengthen the law to make the 
possibility of an inappropriate release order even less likely,” it 
was, “however, somewhat concerned about the mandatory nature 
of the proposed amendment.”123
The letter addressed those concerns of the mandatory nature 
of the proposal that would become § 3143(b)(2) by describing two 
examples illustrating the need for an exception.  First, it 
described “a situation in which the convicted defendant does not 
pose either a danger to the community if released or a risk of 
flight, and in which the appeal raises a substantial question of 
law.”
 
124  Specifically, “an elderly man convicted under 
18 U.S.C. [§] 1111 of the mercy killing of his spouse, who has 
lived in the community all his life without prior incident, and 
who is challenging the applicability of the federal murder statute 
to mercy killings, a question of first impression in the circuit.”125  
Second, it described a situation in which “a convicted drug dealer 
who, because of wounds incurred during his capture, was 
temporarily incapacitated and thus not likely to commit further 
crimes or to flee, and whose appeal raised a novel and difficult 
search or seizure question on which the conviction will stand or 
fall.”126
while we have no doubt of Congress’s power to mandate the 
detention of persons convicted of violent crimes or drug offenses, 
  The letter concluded by noting that,  
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. (emphasis added). 
124 Id. (emphasis added). 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 Id. (emphasis added). 
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whose crimes call for a sentence of imprisonment, we believe 
that, as a matter of policy, some mechanism should exist so 
that, in the extraordinary case, the court could order release.127
The letter spawned the one-sentence addition to 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), which is the sentence that the eight 
appellate courts interpret incorrectly.  That sentence is in 
emphasis as follows:  
  
(c) Appeal from a release or detention order.—An appeal from a 
release or detention order, or from a decision denying revocation 
or amendment of such an order, is governed by the provisions of 
section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title.  The appeal 
shall be determined promptly.  A person subject to detention 
pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), and who meets the 
conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may 
be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the 
judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional 
reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.128
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s plain text, a defendant who falls 
within the purview of § 3143(a)(2) by committing crimes of 
violence, certain drug crimes, and crimes with life sentences, may 
win on an appeal of a detention order if he can satisfy two tests.  
First, he must meet § 3143(a)(1)’s requirements,
 
129 which are 
that he will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 
community.130  Second, he must “clearly show[ ] that there are 
exceptional reasons why [his] detention would not be 
appropriate.”131
It is colorable to suggest that the intent driving Congress to 
draft § 3145(c) was to create an exception for district courts to 
use when deciding whether to grant bail pending the convicted 
person’s appeal and that Congress simply did not draft § 3145(c) 
properly.  This is so because the Justice Department’s letter 
suggested an exception to assuage its concern “about the 
mandatory nature of the proposed amendment” and the other  
 
  So a convicted person must convince the 
appellate court that he is not a flight risk or danger to the 
community and must show that “exceptional reasons” supporting 
bail exist. 
 
127 Id. (emphasis added). 
128 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (2006). 
129 See id. 
130 Id. § 3143(a)(1). 
131 Id. § 3145(c).  
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bail provisions all included exceptions that district courts could 
use.  Only the provision dealing with bail pending appeal 
contained no exception for district court usage. 
But § 3145(c)’s text does not comport with that colorable 
congressional desire.  The text does not permit district courts to 
use the “exceptional reasons” exception when evaluating whether 
to grant bail to a convicted person pending his appeal.  Instead, 
the text applies only to federal appellate courts during their 
review of district court orders of both types of bail decisions—
sentencing or appeals. 
As to the issue of district courts and their decisionmaking 
regarding bail pending sentencing, nothing in the legislative 
history suggests that district courts should have the ability to use 
the “exceptional reasons” exception.  Indeed, Congress already 
included an exception for district court usage in 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) itself.  Moreover, Congress had the 
intention not to give district courts much discretion in their 
decisionmaking process.132
 
132 See supra Part II.D. 
  So the notion that Congress would 
create a single exception, which presents an onerous, compound 
structure for the three classes of serious convicted persons to 
satisfy before gaining bail, in addition to a broad exception that 
requires less than the first exception is, almost illogical.  That 
would mean that Congress was trying to limit district courts of 
their discretion in one provision of the Act, but then inject wide 
discretion in the next provision.  If that were the case—that 
district courts could use the broad discretion embedded in 
§ 3145(c)—Congress created a situation where the exception 
swallows the rule.  Specifically, the hurdles preventing a person 
convicted of one of the crimes prescribed in § 3143(a)(2) from 
being released on bail pending sentencing would disappear 
because the convicted person could simply ignore § 3143(a)(2) 
and resort to § 3145(c), which contains little of § 3143(a)(2)’s 
impediments to bail.  The proposition that Congress intended to 
offer district courts a second, broad exception is unlikely, 
especially in light of the numerous statements from Senator 
Simon and Representative Glickman about curtailing courts’ 
discretion. 
CP_Walia (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:24 PM 
2011] MANDATORY DETENTION ACT 205 
III. SECTION 3145(C)’S STATUTORY MEANING 
A. Statutory Interpretation Principles 
It is certainly understandable that courts are tempted to 
create expedients to come to, what they believe are, fairer results 
under the statute.  Indeed, the hypothetical situations in the 
Justice Department’s letter to Senator Simon are illustrative of 
situations in which the fairer result would be to release the 
criminal until sentencing.133
The familiar first step in interpreting an Act of Congress is 
to “begin with the text of the . . . Act itself.”
  But when courts are interpreting 
congressional acts, it is not their place to inject their view of 
fairness because of this bedrock principle:  Statutory text 
governs. 
134  The “task is to 
give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been 
expressed in reasonably plain terms” in the statutory language, 
“that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”135  
“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text”—“not the 
legislative history or any other extrinsic material.”136
 
133 See United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1018 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003).see also 
United States v. Hooks, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312–14 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (finding 
“exceptional reasons” and thus granting bail to a woman “so as to allow her to make 
provisions for the care of her three minor children”); United States v. Chen, 257 F. 
Supp. 2d 656, 664 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing a situation in which the court felt 
tempted to use the “exceptional reasons” exception because the “defendant [was] 
married and the father of a very young child”). 
  The  
 
 
134 See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1993); see also BedRoc Ltd., 
LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (stating that the statutory-
interpretation “inquiry begins with the statutory text”); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“[W]e 
begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision 
in question . . . .”); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 
117, 128 (1991) (“As always, we begin with the language of the statute and ask 
whether Congress has spoken on the subject before us.”); Bd. of Educ. of Westside 
Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990) (“Our immediate task is therefore 
one of statutory interpretation. We begin, of course, with the language of the 
statute.”); 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 8382 (4th ed. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has admonished 
courts for years to give effect to statutory language. . . . Questions of statutory 
interpretation should be resolved from the legislative language if possible.”). 
135 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 104 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 
U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
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“plainness” of the at-issue statutory language is determined by 
examining the language itself, the specific context in which the 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute.137
When interpreting statutory language during step one, 
courts should construe statutory language to avoid 
interpretations that would render any phrase superfluous.
 
138  
Indeed, “[i]t is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that 
‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.’ ”139  Courts must therefore interpret the 
statute “ ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’140 
and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into an [sic] harmonious whole.’ ”141  
Relatedly, courts must interpret subsections of a statute in the 
context of the whole enactment.142
 
137 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating that 
resorting to legislative history is unnecessary “if the statutory language is 
unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent’ ” (quoting 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos 
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 
803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words 
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
240–41 (1989); United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2001); Marshak 
v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). 
  Therefore, “[w]hen 
‘interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a 
particular clause in which general words may be used, but will 
138 See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).   
139 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)); see United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ali 
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 237 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, as establishing “our duty to give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of a statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But 
courts may not, in pursuit of giving effect to every word, “virtually destroy the 
meaning of the entire context” by giving “them a significance which would be clearly 
repugnant to the statute, looked at as a whole, and destructive of its obvious intent.” 
Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., 234 U.S. 188, 191 (1914).    
140 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). 
141 Id. (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). 
142 United Savs. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified 
by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .”). See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & 
J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47:2 (7th ed. 2008). 
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take in connection with it the whole statute.’ ”143  If the statute’s 
language is unambiguous, that language governs,144
If, however, the language is unclear, courts will progress to 
step two and attempt to discern Congress’s intent using canons of 
statutory interpretation.
 and a court’s 
inquiry is thus complete. 
145  The goal is to determine Congress’s 
intent as embodied in particular statutory language.146  Not 
surprisingly, to determine congressional intent, courts usually 
resort to legislative history.147
 
143 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 
60 U.S. 183, 194 (1957)).   
  
144 See, e.g., BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 177 (“The inquiry 
begins with the statutory text, and ends there as the text is unambiguous.”); 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating that resorting to 
legislative history is unnecessary “if the statutory language is unambiguous and the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 142 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2001); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).  
145 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 89–91, 94 (2001); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447–48 (1987); United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 
308, 310 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that step two requires courts to “attempt to discern 
Congress’ intent using the canons of statutory construction”). 
146 Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94.  
147 See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 
(1990) (stating that since a phrase was ambiguous the Court would “normally resort 
to legislative history”); see also Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n v. 203 North 
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 462 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that if 
a statute’s language is ambiguous, the legislative history is examined next); Wright 
v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 433 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (stating that if the text is unclear, “[w]e then review[ ] the legislative 
history of the statute and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional intent to create enforceable rights”); United States v. Vogel 
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982) (resorting to legislative history to determine 
congressional intent of ambiguous statutory text); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. 
v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (noting that after reviewing 
statutory text, “we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of 
statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent”). At least one member of 
the Court, Justice Scalia, finds resorting to legislative history unproductive in 
determining congressional intent. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 
617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that legislative history is 
“unreliable . . . as a genuine indicator of congressional intent”). Justice Breyer, by 
contrast, has attempted to demonstrate legislative history’s propriety and 
usefulness. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).  
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B. Section 3145(c) Unambiguously Confines Itself To Use by 
Courts of Appeals Only  
Section 3145(c) of title 18 of the United States Code 
uncontrovertibly applies only to appellate courts reviewing 
decisions from district courts on appeal because of its title, text, 
internal structure, statutory structure, and legislative history. 
First, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title indicates that it deals with 
appeals: “Appeal from a release or detention order.”148
Second, § 3145(c)’s text deals with appellate courts.  Indeed, 
its first sentence discusses appeals and appellate courts:  “An 
appeal from a release or detention order, or from a decision 
denying revocation or amendment of such an order, is governed 
by the provisions of section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of 
this title.”
   
149  Both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 deal 
solely with the review of district court final orders by appellate 
courts.150
 
148 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (2006); see also United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 
948, 955 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“As a preliminary matter, Section 3145(c) is titled ‘[a]ppeal 
from a release or detention order . . . .’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)). The Supreme Court has noted that “statutory titles and section 
headings ‘are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a 
statute.’ ” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) 
(quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)). 
  The second sentence, also, unambiguously notes that 
149 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (emphasis added); see United States v. Mellies, 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 930, 933 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (“The initial sentence of § 3145(c) . . . logically 
might lead the reader to conclude that subsection (c) pertains to review of a release 
or detention order by the court of appeals.”).  
150 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3731; see also Mellies, 496 F. Supp. 
2d at 933 (stating that both of these statutes deal with “appellate jurisdiction”); 
United States v. Nesser, 937 F. Supp. 507, 509 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that both of 
these statutes relate solely to review of a final order of a district court by a court of 
appeals). Section 1291, which is titled “Final Decisions of District Courts,” provides 
as follows:  
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of 
the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for 
the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the 
Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 
1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.  
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). Section 3731, which governs “Appeal[s] by the 
United States,” provides in relevant part as follows: 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision 
or order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the 
release of a person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a 
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“[t]he appeal shall be determined promptly.”151  The term 
“district court” does not appear anywhere in § 3145(c).  Thus, as 
one court aptly put it, “[i]n light of this language [in § 3145(c)], it 
is illogical to postulate that a district court should apply § 3145(c) 
when initially ruling on a release or detention motion.”152
Third, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s internal structure 
unambiguously confines the statute to appellate courts.  The title 
and first two sentences, which lucidly apply to appellate courts—
because of the references to “[a]ppeal from,” “[a]n appeal,” 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and “[t]he appeal”—would be 
vitiated if district courts could use the “exceptional reasons” 
clause.  An interpretation that district courts could use that 
clause would ignore the five references to appeals or appellate 
courts within the section.
 
153  To read § 3145(c) to apply to district 
courts would render both the statutory title and subsection (c)’s 
first two sentences meaningless, in violation of the “ ‘cardinal 
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the 
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, 
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ”154  
In addition, allowing district courts to use the “exceptional 
reasons” clause in spite of § 3145(c)’s internal structure—with its 
myriad references to appeals or appellate courts that courts 
cannot ignore—would lead to the absurd result of district courts 
hearing appeals of their own orders.155
Fourth, the entire statutory structure of 18 U.S.C. § 3145 
unambiguously confines the statute to appellate courts.  Courts 
must read statutes, if possible, “as a symmetrical and coherent 
   
 
motion for revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or 
order granting release. 
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added).    
151 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  
152 United States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 648, 652 (W.D. Pa. 1994).  
153 See Nesser, 937 F. Supp. at 509 (stating that “it is not logical to construe the 
first sentence as giving the district courts power to hear appeals (from themselves, 
no less)”).   
154 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).  
155 See United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“By 
definition, a court cannot hear an appeal from its own order.”); see also United 
States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 956 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (stating that allowing 
district courts to use § 3145(c) would involve “a contrived reading” of the statute 
given “that district judges would hear appeals from themselves”).  
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regulatory scheme.”156  Section 3145’s subsections (a) and (b) deal 
with a district court’s review of bail or a detention order decided 
by a magistrate judge or a sister district court.157  Thus, 
subsection (a) and (b), titled “Review of a release order” and 
“Review of a detention order,” respectively, reveal that the 
statute is about reviewing the underlying district court’s order, 
not about the decisionmaking process by which a district court 
arrives at its decision.  Congress permitted a district court to 
review a magistrate judge’s order in subsections (a) and (b) and 
permitted a court of appeals to review a district court’s decision 
in subsection (c).158  Thus, allowing district courts to use § 3145(c) 
when ruling on a motion seeking bail pending sentencing would 
be inconsistent with subsections (a) and (b).159
Fifth, the legislative history supports the interpretation that 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) applies only to courts of appeals.  Most 
strikingly, Senator Simon and Representative Glickman stated 
their beliefs that the “exceptional circumstances” touchstone was 
intended to apply “[i]n the appeals setting,” without any 
suggestion of application in the district court setting.
 
160
Moreover, in addition to codifying the intent to restrict the 
“exceptional reasons” provision to “the appeals setting” by 
unambiguously saying so in § 3145(c), ongress codified that 
intent in two other ways.  First, it did so by placing the 
“exceptional reasons” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3145 and not in 
18 U.S.C. § 3143, as it did for the other two amendments in the 
   
 
156 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)–(b) (2006). 
158 Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (“Read in its natural progression, it makes 
sense that that after the statute provides review by a district court of a magistrate 
judge’s order in parts (a) and (b), part (c) would provide the parties the right to seek 
‘[a]ppeal from a release or detention order’ given by a district court.” (alteration in 
original)).   
159 The Supreme Court has referred to 18 U.S.C. § 3145 as the “review 
provisions . . . provid[ing] for immediate appellate review of [a] detention decision.” 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). Though Salerno referred to 
§ 3145 before the 1990 Amendment, which added § 3145(c), its statement still holds 
true: Section 3145, as a whole, deals with reviews of the underlying district court 
decision on bail.    
160 See 136 CONG. REC. 3466 (1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,712 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon). 
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1990 Mandatory Detention Act.161  That is, of the three 
amendments contained in the 1990 Act, Congress placed two in 
18 U.S.C. § 3143 and one in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  So if Congress 
had intended to allow district courts to use the “exceptional 
reasons” provision, then surely it would have added that 
provision to 18 U.S.C. § 3143—not to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).162
Second, Congress codified its intent to restrict § 3145(c) to 
appellate courts by promulgating Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 46 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(c).  
Criminal Procedure Rule 46 states that “[t]he provisions of 
18 U.S.C. § 3143 govern release pending sentencing or appeal.”
   
163  
It contains no suggestion that district courts can use 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  Appellate Procedure Rule 9(c), by contrast, 
states that “[t]he [appellate] court must make its decision 
regarding release in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3143, and 3145(c).”164  By promulgating 
Criminal Procedure Rule 46 and Appellate Procedure Rule 9(c), 
Congress demonstrated that district courts are not permitted to 
use 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).165
 
161 See United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Why 
would Congress, primarily concerned with amending section 3143, place the 
‘exceptional reasons’ provision in an entirely different section? The only plausible 
answer is the one supported by the text itself: Congress intended section 3145(c) for 
the appellate courts alone.”); United States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 648, 652 (W.D. 
Pa. 1994) (“The fact that Congress inserted the ‘exceptional reasons’ language in 
§ 3145(c) indicated that [it] intended this discretion to be limited to the judges of the 
courts of appeals.”).  
  
162 Cf. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 544 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) 
(“We find it informative that Congress placed § 1146(a) in a subchapter entitled, 
‘POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS’. . . . The placement of § 1146(a) within a 
subchapter expressly limited to postconfirmation matters undermines Piccadilly’s 
view that § 1146(a) covers preconfirmation transfers.”). Two courts have noted that 
the placement of the “exceptional reasons” provision undercuts the argument that 
the provision is available to district courts. See United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 
2d 948, 957 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“If the Congress had intended to invest district courts 
with the discretion to determine whether exceptional reasons existed, [ ] it would 
have said so in § 3143.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 242 F. 
Supp. 2d 489, 492 (E.D. Mich. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chen, 257 
F. Supp. 2d at 661 (“The placement of the ‘exceptional reasons’ provision is 
especially telling in light of the fact that it was adopted at the same time as the 
mandatory detention amendments to section 3143.”). 
163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). 
164 FED. R. APP. P. 9(c) (emphasis added). 
165 See Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 132 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that, if 
Congress does not change a procedural rule proposed by the Supreme Court within a 
prescribed seven-month window, it approves the rule).  
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The cumulative arc of legislative history also supports our 
conclusion.  Specifically, on each occasion in which Congress 
acted to change the bail laws—1966, 1984, and 1990—Congress 
expressed a desire to narrow the federal courts’ ability to grant 
bail.  For example, Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
to limit judges’ discretion in granting bail before sentencing or 
appeal.  And it enacted the Mandatory Bail Act “to prevent the 
release on bail of convicted drug traffickers or violent criminals 
who are awaiting sentencing or appeal.”166
Finally, it would be illogical for district courts to use 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) because § 3145(c) deals with appellate review.  
Legislative history supports the notion that Congress intended to 
narrow district courts’ discretion in granting bail pending 
sentencing to persons convicted of the crimes listed in 
§ 3143(f).
  Therefore, a holistic 
view of federal legislation governing bail illustrates that 
Congress intended to erase courts’ discretion in granting bail.   
167  It would be anomalous for Congress to codify that 
desire by creating a stringent exception to the general rule that 
district courts should detain those convicted persons pending 
sentencing but then create a broad exception that obviates the 
thrust of § 3143(a)(2).  Congress’s work in creating § 3143(a)(2) 
would be for naught:  Section 3143(a)(2)’s rule to detain unless a 
stringent exception is satisfied would be swallowed by § 3145(c)’s 
broad exception.168
 
166 135 CONG. REC. 27,711 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis added).  
  Put another way, Congress would have  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 See supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text.  
168 See United States v. Green, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1147 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 2003) 
(stating that to qualify for bail under § 3145(c), the convicted person is not required 
to meet the requirements of § 3142(a)(2)). If this odd situation were the 
interpretation, convicted persons would never file motions under 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), with its stringent exception, and instead, would always file 
motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), with its easier exception. 
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narrowed judicial discretion for district courts in one section, 
§ 3142(a)(2), only to have broadened judicial discretion for 
district courts in another section, § 3145(c).169
In sum, both 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s text and legislative history 
categorically restrict its usage to appellate courts only. 
  
IV. JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Federal Courts of Appeals 
The eight federal appellate courts that have analyzed this 
issue have all incorrectly concluded that district courts may 
apply the “exceptional reasons” provision.170
The Fifth Circuit, in 1991, was the first federal court of 
appeals to analyze the issue in United States v. Carr.
   
171  Both 
Defendants in that case where convicted of a conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, an offense with a 
maximum sentence of forty years.172  During the time before trial, 
both women were on release because the court determined that 
they were neither flight risks nor dangerous to the community.173  
After conviction, both women filed motions seeking bail pending 
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).174  The district court 
correctly denied their motions175
 
 because once a court decides 
that the exception contained in § 3142(a)(2) is inapplicable, the 
inquiry is over. 
 
169 See United States v. Sabhnani, 529 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“The test under § 3145(c) is necessarily a flexible one, and district courts have wide 
latitude to determine whether a particular set of circumstances qualifies as 
‘exceptional.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lea, 360 F.3d 401, 403 
(2d Cir. 2004))); see also United States v. Rentas, No. 09–CR–555(HB), 2009 WL 
3444943, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009) (stating that § 3145(c) presents a 
“ ‘somewhat amorphous standard [that] invites a case-by-case evaluation’ of the 
circumstances and arguments” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lippold, 
175 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); United States v. Reboux, No 5:06–CR–
451, 2007 WL 4409801, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007) (“This [exceptional reasons] 
language is quite broad.”).  
170 United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that 
“every court of appeals” that has “considered the question ha[s] concluded that 
section 3145(c) allows district courts to release a defendant”).  
171 See 947 F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).   
172 Id. 
173 See id.  
174 Id. 
175 See id. 
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The Fifth Circuit ignored that mandate, injecting discretion 
to the district court to use 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  It noted that 
“[s]ection 3145(c) is confusing because it is entitled ‘appeal from a 
release or detention order.’ ”176  But the court nevertheless 
determined that district courts can use the provision because the 
last sentence of § 3145(c), with its reference to “the judicial 
officer,” indicated so.  According to the court, “[t]his sentence was 
added to § 3145(c) with the mandatory detention provisions of 
§ 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2) and was apparently designed to provide an 
avenue for exceptional discretionary relief from those 
provisions.”177  The court noted that § 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2) “use 
the term ‘judicial officer’ when referring to the individuals 
initially ordering such mandatory detention.”178  It concluded by 
finding support from two district court decisions that interpreted 
§ 3145 like it did, and it stated that “[w]e see no reason why 
Congress would have limited this means of relief to reviewing 
courts.”179
Of course, when the text is clear, it is unnecessary to 
speculate about Congress’s motivations.  The Fifth Circuit 
sidestepped a textual analysis; it did not explain how it found 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, or statutory 
structure ambiguous.  Instead, it found that the statute 
unambiguously applies to district courts because of its use of “the 
judicial officer.”
 
180
“Judicial officer” is defined as follows:  
  That term, however, does not make the 
statute apply to district courts; it, in fact, supports the notion 
that the statute applies unambiguously to courts of appeals only.   
[U]nless otherwise indicated, any person or court authorized 
pursuant to section 3041 of this title, or the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to detain or release a person before trial or 
sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, 
and any judge of the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia.181
 
176 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (2006)).  
   
177 See id. (citing Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 902, 104 
Stat. 4826, 4827). 
178 Id.  
179 Id. (emphasis added).  
180 Id. 
181 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3041 includes all “judge[s] of 
the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3041. 
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“Judicial officer” can thus mean either a single person or a court 
depending on the context in which it is used.182
In 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), Congress confined the statute for use 
by “the judicial officer.”
 
183  The article “the” is important; it limits 
the ambit of “judicial officer” to the particular “judicial officer” to 
whom the statute refers—appellate courts.  Imagine if Congress 
wrote “court” instead of “judicial officer” in § 3145(c).  The phrase 
“the court” would limit “court” to a particular court instead of the 
entire universe of courts.  The universe of possible “judicial 
officer[s]” is limited depending upon the grammatical article 
before it and the context of the statute in which it applies.  
Section 3145(c) applies to an “appeal from a release or a 
detention order,” and the term “the judicial officer” thus refers to 
the particular appellate court hearing the appeal.184
Senator Simon illustrated this language usage point clearly 
when discussing the provision that would become 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c):  “[I]n the appeals setting, if the attorney for 
the government files a motion indicating that there are 
exceptional circumstances which warrant release and the 
defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community, 
the judicial officer may order release.”
   
185
 
182 See United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 956 (E.D. Ky. 2009) 
(“Therefore, the definition [of ‘judicial officer’] provides that the term . . . can mean 
either a single judge (‘any person’) or a full ‘court’ depending on the context in which 
it is used.”).  
  He used the term 
183 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (emphasis added).  
184 See Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (stating that the term “judicial officer” is 
not “ambiguous, but rather, that its meaning is limited in this context to appellate 
courts.”); United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating 
that use of “judicial officer” in § 3145(c) is “narrower” than all of its possibilities 
because “[i]n the context of a provision dealing with appellate review, ‘judicial 
officer’ must be read to mean only appellate judges”). In operation, a convicted 
person would appeal from a district court’s order denying bail presentencing decided 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). The convicted person would argue on appeal that the 
appellate court should order his release under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). At this point, 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a)(3) is triggered. It provides that “[t]he court 
of appeals or one of its judges may order the defendant’s release pending the 
disposition of the appeal.” FED. R. APP. P. 9(a)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, “the 
judicial officer” authorized to use § 3145(c) is either the appellate court or a single 
judge of that appellate court who can authorize release until the appellate court 
renders its ultimate decision. See Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 956–57 (stating that the 
conclusion that “the term ‘the judicial officer’ logically applies to appellate 
judges . . . is bolstered” by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a)(3) because it 
also demonstrates “that the singular use of the term ‘judicial officer’ within section 
3145(c) logically applies to appellate judges”).  
185 135 CONG. REC. 27,712 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis added).  
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“judicial officer” to refer to the decision maker or tribunal in 
which the issue exists.  His statement makes clear that use of the 
term “judicial officer” was not always intended to include the 
entire universe of its definition.  Instead, the term is limited by 
the word “the,” which means the term refers to one type of 
“judicial officer”; that one type of judicial officer is the court in 
“the appeals setting”—appellate courts.   
The term “judicial officer” comprises various members of the 
judiciary, including, inter alia, magistrate judges, district court 
judges, and federal appellate judges.186
Similarly, Senator Simon used “the judicial officer” to mean 
a different particular type of judicial officer when describing 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).  He noted that § 3143(a)(2)’s exception 
was intended for another type of “judicial officer”—a district 
court:  “[I]n the presentencing setting, if an attorney for the 
government will recommend a sentence of no incarceration or if 
the judicial officer finds that there is a substantial likelihood the 
defendant’s motion for [a] new trial or acquittal will be 
granted . . . the judicial officer may release the defendant.”
  But Senator Simon’s 
statement makes clear that “judicial officer” was not intended to 
include the entire array of its possible definition.   
187  
The use of “the judicial officer” in that context limits the term’s 
possibilities to district courts because only district courts deal 
with defendants’ motions in the presentencing setting.188
 
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1). 
  
Concededly, it was awkward for Congress to include courts 
187 135 CONG. REC. 27,711–12 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis 
added). 
188 One scholar, however, has argued that Congress intended the term “judicial 
officer” in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to apply to district courts in addition to appellate 
courts. See Rosen, supra note 25, at 27. Specifically, Mr. Rosen notes that “during 
the drafting of section 3145(c), the section’s original text stated that the exceptional 
reasons issue could be addressed ‘by a court of appeals or a judge thereof.’ ” See id. at 
27 n.41 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 11,026 (1990)). According to Mr. Rosen, the 
“change[ ] made to the provision during its drafting further support[s] the principle 
that a district court may address bail motions raising exceptional reasons.” Rosen, 
supra note 25, at 27. But that drafting change surmount the statements by Senator 
Simon and Representative Glickman that confined § 3145(c) to “the appeals setting.” 
Moreover, given all of Congress’s statements about narrowing courts’ discretion, it is 
more likely that Congress used the term “judicial officer” solely for statutory 
consistency. That is, because it was able to limit the term “judicial officer” with 
“the,” Congress was able to use the same term throughout the statutory structure 
with its particular ambit narrowing for particular provisions. For instance, “the 
judicial officer” was limited to mean district courts in the context of § 3143(a)(2), 
while it was limited to mean appellate courts in the context of § 3145(c).  
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within the ambit of “judicial officer,” but that is undeniably what 
they did in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a).189
In spite of Carr’s shortcomings in failing to properly 
interpret § 3145(c),
  And even though Congress’s 
decision to include an entity—a court—into the definition of 
“judicial officer” was awkward, that decision did not create an 
ambiguity in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), especially in light of the 
plethora of references to appellate courts and appeals within 
§ 3145(c).  Perhaps Congress simply decided that statutory 
consistency outweighed awkwardness and thus decided to use 
the same term—“judicial officer”—throughout the statutory 
scheme, restricting it with “the” when needed.  
190 some courts of appeals have simply decided 
this important issue by citing to Carr.191  For instance, the 
Second Circuit, in reviewing a district court’s use of § 3145(c), 
noted the district court’s analysis of § 3143(b)(1)’s requirements 
and assumed that, after § 3143(b)(1)’s application, “[o]nly then 
does the trial court consider the presence of exceptional 
circumstances making detention inappropriate.”192  It cited Carr 
for support and then proceeded to analyze whether the district 
court was correct on the merits.193
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit decided this important issue by 
approving the district court’s holding on the issue, which simply 
quoted Carr.  The Eighth Circuit did not analyze 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, statutory 
structure, or legislative history.  It simply noted approvingly that 
“the Fifth Circuit held that § 3145(c) relief is not limited to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1).  
190 See United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(criticizing Carr’s reasoning); see also United States v. Harrison, 430 F. Supp. 2d 
1378, 1383 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (“The Chen court then proceeded to deconstruct the 
three reasons proffered in Carr . . . .”).  
191 See Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The [appellate] courts 
that have held that section 3145(c) is available to district courts almost uniformly 
cite, without discussion, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Carr.”). 
192 United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991). 
193 DiSomma is not without its in-Circuit critics. The District Court for the 
District of Vermont has noted that it it viewed “§ 3145(c) by its very provisions [as 
applying] exclusively to reviewing courts and not to the court which initially ordered 
release or detention.” United States v. Bloomer, 791 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Vt. 1992).  
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reviewing courts; district courts may release a defendant who has 
been convicted.  This court . . . agrees with the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.”194
The Tenth Circuit also neglected to engage in full analysisof 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, or statutory 
structure.
   
195  It posited that “[t]his court has never addressed 
directly the question of whether the ‘exceptional reasons’ 
provision of § 3145(c) applies to requests for release made to the 
district court.”196  The court then noted that it had affirmed a 
case without an opinion in which the district court considered 
whether exceptional reasons existed.197  Finally, it concluded that 
it joined “[a]ll the other circuits that have addressed the issue 
have ruled that the ‘exceptional reasons’ provision does apply to 
district courts.”198
The Ninth Circuit also neglected to engage in a full 
analysis.
 
199  In a footnote, the court addressed the issue by simply 
stating the inquiry, citing its sister circuits, and agreeing with 
them:  “Although the ‘exceptional reasons’ provision appears in a 
subsection that otherwise concerns actions taken by appellate 
courts, we agree with the other circuits to have addressed the 
issue that the district court has authority to determine whether 
there are exceptional reasons.”200
The Sixth Circuit, like the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, 
analyzed the issue but briefly, without reviewing 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, or statutory 
structure.
 
201
 
194 United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) 
(quoting trial court’s order dated Nov. 18, 1993).  
  The court noted that, although it had “never 
explicitly held in a published opinion that the district court has 
authority to release a defendant being detained pursuant to 
§ 3142(a)(2) upon a showing of ‘exceptional reasons’ under 
§ 3145(c), [it had] reached that conclusion in an unpublished 
195 See Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 662 n.22 (describing the Tenth Circuit’s 
reasoning as “curt”).  
196 United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
197 See id. 
198 Id. 
199 See Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 662 n.22 (describing the appellate courts’ 
cursory analysis).   
200 United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1014 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).   
201 See United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870, 870–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (order 
reversing authorization of detention pending sentencing).  
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opinion.”202  And given that unpublished case’s “holding, the 
unanimous agreement of other circuits that have considered the 
issue, and the government’s concession of error,” it held that “the 
district court erred in not considering whether [the defendant] 
established exceptional reasons to support his release pending 
sentencing.”203  The Sixth Circuit’s reliance on its earlier, 
unpublished decision is misplaced since that panel also did not 
analyze § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, or statutory 
structure.204
The Seventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit are the only 
courts of appeals to join the Fifth Circuit in engaging in detailed, 
albeit incorrect, analysis of the issue.   
 
In United States v. Herrera-Soto,205 Herrera-Soto appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit from a district court’s order imposing 
mandatory detention pending his appeal after analyzing, but 
rejecting, the “exceptional reasons” provision.206  The Seventh 
Circuit discussed why district courts, in its view, could use  
the provision.  It acknowledged that, “[a]lthough the 
provision . . . appears in a section titled ‘Appeal from a Release or 
Detention Order,’ this provision should be read in conjunction 
with the portion of the statute outlining the general procedures 
for release pending appeal.”207  This is so, according to the court, 
because “[t]he ‘exceptional reason’ provision § 3145(c) was added 
to the Bail Reform Act along with the amendment providing for 
mandatory detention in certain circumstances.”208
It was therefore included as an avenue of relief from the 
mandatory detention provisions, which in turn constitute a 
portion of the general provisions for release pending appeal.  
The statute does not indicate that Congress intended that a 
person having “exceptional reasons” sufficient to override 
mandatory detention should be limited to a period of release 
  According to 
the court: 
 
202 Id. (citing United States v. Cook, 42 F. App’x 803, 804 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(unpublished)).  
203 Id. (citing United States v. Goforth, 546 F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 2008); Garcia, 
340 F.3d at 1014 n.1) (citation omitted). 
204 See Cook, 42 F. App’x at 804 (resolving this important issue by simply stating 
that district courts are “not precluded from making a determination of exceptional 
circumstances in support of release”). 
205 961 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).   
206 Id. at 646.   
207 Id. at 647. 
208 Id. 
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only while an appeal of the detention order is pending.  Read in 
context, such a limitation, would obviously narrow the relief 
intended by Congress.209
The court’s reasoning contains two mistakes.  First, it 
ignored § 3145(c)’s text.  When the text is clear, resorting to 
legislative history is of course unnecessary.
   
210  The text reveals 
that the statute applies in the appeals setting.  Second, in 
viewing the legislative history, the court did not appreciate that 
Congress intended to curtail, not expand, its discretion.  Its 
statement that “[t]he statute does not indicate that Congress 
intended that a person having ‘exceptional reasons’ sufficient to 
override mandatory detention should be limited to a period of 
release only while an appeal of the detention order is pending”211 
ignores the legislative history that the provision was confined to 
a discussion of the “appeals setting.”212  Moreover, the court’s 
statement that “such a limitation [of appellate courts only using 
§ 3145(c)], would obviously narrow the relief intended by 
Congress” is vitiated by the legislative history that actually 
supports narrowing courts’ discretion and ability to grant bail.213
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the 
issue.  In United States v. Goforth,
  
Of course, the Seventh Circuit should not have resorted to 
assaying the legislative history in the first place.   
214 “Goforth moved the district 
judge for review of the detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145, 
arguing that ‘exceptional reasons’ made detention 
inappropriate.”215  The district judge denied the motion, holding 
that he “is not a ‘judicial officer’ within the meaning of § 3145(c) 
and therefore ha[d] no authority under the subsection to 
determine whether ‘exceptional reasons’ exist.”216
The Fourth Circuit, finding that the statute unambiguously 
applied to district courts, reversed the district court.
   
217
 
209 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
  It stated 
that the “definition [of ‘judicial officer’] unquestionably 
encompasses district judges,” and it thus held “that district 
210 See supra Part III.A. 
211 Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d at 647. 
212 See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
213 Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added). 
214 546 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2008). 
215 Id. at 713.   
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 715. 
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judges unambiguously qualify as ‘judicial officers’ under 
§ 3145(c).”218  The court erred, however, in failing to note that the 
term “judicial officer” had been limited by “the.”219  Furthermore, 
although noting that “the general context of that section and its 
title may suggest that it addresses appellate judges,” the court 
failed to analyze § 3145’s title, text, internal structure, or 
statutory structure.220
The court then stated that it “would reach the same result 
even if [it] assumed arguendo that the text of § 3145(c) is 
ambiguous” because the “legislative history leads us to the 
conclusion that the term ‘judicial officer’ here includes district 
judges.”
 
221  The court reasoned that, because Congress changed 
the proposed language in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) from “ ‘by a court of 
appeals or a judge thereof’ ” to “ ‘the judicial 
officer[,]’ . . . Congress intended to include district judges among 
those who could grant ‘exceptional reasons’ relief.”222  The court 
erred because it viewed but one piece of legislative history, which 
is not conclusive,223 and failed to examine the explicit statements 
made by Senator Simon and Representative Glickman indicating 
their intent that § 3145(c) be confined to “the appeals setting.”224
It ordinarily would be powerful indicia of correctness when 
all eight federal appellate courts are in accord on an issue.  But, 
as detailed above, the group’s projection of a sturdy consensus is 
a facade because several of them did not analyze the issue 
thoroughly and the other courts engaged in only some analysis.
 
225
 
218 Id. 
   
 
 
219 See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text. 
220 Goforth, 546 F.3d at 715. 
221 Id. (emphasis added). 
222 Id. (citing Rosen, supra note 25, at 27 n.41). 
223 See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress, by 
limiting the term “judicial officer” with “the,” was able to use the same term 
throughout the statutory structure with its particular scope narrowing in particular 
contexts).  
224 See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
225 See United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 936 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(“[T]his seemingly powerful list of authorities holds considerably less persuasive 
value than an initial glance at the string cite would ordinarily indicate.”); United 
States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that all six 
courts of appeals that had analyzed the issue before the Chen Court “ha[d] uniformly 
given the question cursory treatment, foregoing rigorous statutory analysis in favor 
of reliance on stare decisis”).   
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None of the eight circuits meaningfully analyzed 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title, text, internal structure, statutory 
structure, or legislative history.   
B. A Possible yet Unstated Concern 
Perhaps some appellate courts are trying to provide 
discretion to district courts under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) because 
they are wary of the categorical nature of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), 
the statute dealing with bail pending appeal.  That is, 
§ 3143(b)(2), which governs bail for the same three classes of 
persons convicted of serious crimes as § 3143(a)(2), denies bail 
pending their appeal without exception.  Thus, a criminal may 
argue for the exception to obtain bail before sentencing but may 
not argue for any exception to obtain bail pending his appeal 
because none exists.226
Perhaps puzzled about why Congress would not create an 
exception for district court usage for those same convicted 
persons seeking bail pending their appeals, the courts resort to 
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to allow district courts to have 
one exception to § 3143(b)(2).
   
227
C. Tangible Consequences of the Appellate Courts’ Interpretation 
  But courts, regardless of any 
perceived unfairness in convicted persons not having the 
opportunity to argue any exceptions to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), 
should not read 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to provide one because its 
statutory coverage is textually limited to appellate courts.  
The Article’s disagreement with the eight appellate courts is 
not an academic quibble; it is over an issue that is having 
practical, tangible, and negative consequences.  District courts 
 
226 Any potential argument that it is unconstitutional to categorically deny a 
convicted person bail pending his appeal will likely fail because the Eighth 
Amendment does not grant an absolute right to bail. See United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987). 
227 See United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
serious criminals are not eligible for release pending their appeals unless 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) applies); United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1993)  
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Congress added the ‘exceptional reasons’ provision in 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to mitigate the harshness of section 3143(b)(2)’s blanket 
prohibition on release pending appeal in drug cases and cases involving crimes of 
violence.”); United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that 
“[w]hile the language of section 3143(b)(2) compels detention, an exception permits 
release of mandatory detainees who meet the requirements for release under” 
§ 3145(c)). 
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are using 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) as a second exception to 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) to release convicted persons on bail.228
This judicially created exception, § 3145(c), is swallowing 
Congress’s rule that a district court must detain a § 3142(f)(1) 
convicted person unless he satisfies the stringent exception in 
§ 3143(a)(2).  In effect, district courts that grant bail to a person 
convicted of a crime specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or 
(C) based on 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) are using § 3145(c)’s broad 
exception, which should be confined to appellate court usage 
only, to sidestep § 3143(a)(2)’s stringent exception.  
  The 
Article asserts that Congress provided only one exception to 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)—the exception that is actually contained 
in § 3143(a)(2).  The eight courts of appeals have judicially 
created a second exception, in violation of statutory text, for 
district courts that district courts are routinely applying.   
For example, in United States v. Charger, a case where 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) applied and its exception was not met, the 
district court nevertheless granted bail under § 3145(c) because 
the convicted person’s “family needs this time together to heal, to 
pray, to address the [Defendant’s] alcohol problems, and to make 
it likely that defendant will not again act as he did in this 
case.”229  The Charger court found those factors, in addition to the 
defendant’s participation in an alcoholism program, rising to 
“exceptional reasons” warranting release.230
 
  The court should 
have ended the inquiry when it found that the Defendant could 
not satisfy § 3143(a)(2)’s exception.  
 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Teague, No. 1:09cr42, 2009 WL 3261701, at *2 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2009) (stating that a convicted person may be released on bail if he 
satisfies the exception contained in § 3142(a)(2) or the “exception . . . found in 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)”); United States v. Sabhnani, 529 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (stating that “a defendant convicted of a crime of violence and awaiting 
sentencing who cannot satisfy the criteria set forth in § 3143(a)(2) may nevertheless 
be released” under the exception contained in § 3145(c) (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Kaquatosh, 252 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (stating that, even if 
§ 3143(a)(2)’s exception is not satisfied, the convicted person could nevertheless seek 
release under the exception contained in § 3145(c)).   
229 United States v. Charger, 918 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D.S.D. 1996). 
230 See id.; see also United States v. Cantrell, 888 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Nev. 
1995) (finding “exceptional reasons” because the convicted person had been 
participating in a substance abuse program and would benefit more from outpatient 
treatment than from detention). 
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 Its likely that sometimes district court judges might at 
times find it difficult on the human level to levy punishment to a 
sympathetic convicted person.  But when Congress has spoken to 
the contrary, as it has here, it is simply not within the courts’ 
power to substitute their own preferences.  Instead, district 
courts must abide by 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), with its general rule 
to detain and its stringent exception to release only if: (1) it finds 
that there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal 
or new trial will be granted, or the government has recommended 
that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and 
(2) it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 
not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 
community.231
The Charger court is not alone.  Other district courts have 
allowed the exception to swallow Congress’s rule that they must 
detain the § 3142(f)(1) convicted person unless he satisfies the 
difficult-to-satisfy exception in § 3143(a)(2).  For instance, a 
district court found “exceptional reasons” and thus granted 
release to a convicted person pending sentencing because he “had 
done exceptionally well while on pre-trial release,” which 
included obtaining employment, desiring to obtain “a 
psychological evaluation,” and having “stable employment [, 
which] . . . had enabled him to regularly send money home to his 
family.”
 
232
In addition, another district court found “exceptional 
reasons” where a convicted person “fully cooperated with the 
government” and performed “well on pretrial release” by, inter 
alia, renouncing criminal activities, securing full-time 
employment, bringing “himself up to date on his child support 
payments,” and scoring negative results on “all of his urine 
tests.”
 
233  Other district courts have, too, found exceptional 
reasons to release a person convicted of a crime listed under 
§ 3142(f) pending sentencing.234
 
231 See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) (2006). 
   
232 Kaquatosh, 252 F. Supp. at 779–80. 
233 United States v. Mitchell, 358 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708–09 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
234 See United States v. Rentas, No. 09 CR 555(HB), 2009 WL 3444943, at *1–2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009) (finding “exceptional reasons” warranting release pending 
sentencing because convicted person was “gainfully employed,” complied with her 
release terms, cooperated with the government, and had young children who 
suffered from hyperactivity and insomnia); United States v. Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d 
473, 475, 483 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (finding “exceptional reasons” warranting release 
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D. Federal District Courts 
In contrast to the eight courts of appeals and the district 
courts that apply § 3145(c) without questioning whether they 
should, two groups of district courts interpret the disputed 
section differently.   
1. Finding the Language Ambiguous  
Two federal district courts have taken the position that 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s language is ambiguous, and they thus resort 
to the legislative history, which according to them supports the 
view that district courts can use § 3145(c).235  Both courts 
conclude that, “[b]ecause the term ‘judicial officer’ is reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning, . . . [s]ection 3145 of the 
Bail Reform Act is, in fact, ambiguous.”236
 
  Specifically, these 
courts’ determinations that “judicial officer” is ambiguous is 
incorrect, as discussed above. 
 
 
pending sentencing because convicted person believed that detention would threaten 
her health and her unborn baby’s health); United States v. Sabhnani, 529 F. Supp. 
2d 377, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding “exceptional reasons” warranting release 
pending sentencing because convicted person “is solely responsible for operating his 
business” and needed time to arrange care for his four children and wind down his 
family’s financial affairs); United States v. Hooks, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312 (M.D. 
Ala. 2004) (finding “exceptional reasons” warranting release pending sentencing 
because the convicted person needed to take care of her three minor children); see 
also United States v. Reboux, No 5:06–CR–451 (FJS), 2007 WL 4409801, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007) (finding “exceptional reasons” warranting release pending 
sentencing because the convicted person had cooperated with the government and 
displayed “exemplary behavior prior to and during the criminal proceedings”). 
235 See United States v. Miller, 568 F. Supp. 2d 764, 775–76 (E.D. Ky. 2008) 
(holding that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to consider defendant’s 
request for release pending sentencing based upon the “exceptional reasons” 
provision because the text was ambiguous and the legislative history supported 
application by district courts); United States v. Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479–83 
(W.D.N.C. 2008) (same). Price was decided ten months before the Fourth Circuit 
held that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) unambiguously applies to district courts. See United 
States v. Goforth, 546 F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 2008). Price’s holding was unaffected 
by Goforth—both allow district courts to use § 3145(c)—but its reasoning that 
§ 3145(c) is ambiguous is no longer viable law in the Fourth Circuit.   
236 Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 480; see Miller, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (noting that 
“the term ‘judicial officer’ is ‘reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning’ 
inasmuch as it is used throughout the bail statutes to refer to judges at all levels of 
the federal judicial system, depending on the posture of the case” (quoting Price, 618 
F. Supp. at 480)).   
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The term “judicial officer” does not create an ambiguity in 
the statute warranting a resort to legislative history.  As 
described above, the universe of possible “judicial officers” is 
limited by the grammatical article before it and the context of the 
statute in which it applies.237
After finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) is ambiguous, these 
two district courts interpreted the legislative history 
inaccurately.  They noted that “[t]he timing of the [1990] 
amendments to the statutes (i.e., contemporaneous) tends to 
show that by adding the ‘exceptional reasons’ language to 
§ 3145(c), Congress intended to create an exception to the newly 
codified mandatory detention provision within § 3143(a)(2).”
   
238  
This analysis disregards the exception contained in § 3143(a)(2) 
and Congress’s well-documented desire to limit courts’ discretion.  
Moreover, the district court in United States v. Price incorrectly 
interpreted the Justice Department’s letter—which it described 
as “the only useful historical document on the issue”—as “not 
limit[ing] the district court’s ability to entertain such as 
analysis.”239  This statement is incorrect because the Justice 
Department addressed the concern that the proposal that 
ultimately became 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)(2) had no exceptions.240
2. Getting It Right 
 
A group of district courts has gotten it right, in contrast to 
the eight courts of appeals and the two district courts discussed 
above.  They hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) unambiguously 
pertains to only courts of appeals—not district courts.241
 
237 See supra notes 
  These 
175–182 and accompanying text.  
238 Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 480–81; see Miller, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 773 (quoting 
Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 480–81).  
239 Price, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 481.   
240 See supra notes 121–126 and accompanying text.  
241 See United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(holding that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) established that it applies 
only to appeals); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957 (E.D. Ky. 2009) 
(“In the end, the most natural reading of the text, structure, and context of section 
3145(c) leads to the conclusion that Congress grants authority to find ‘exceptional 
reasons’ only to appellate courts.”); United States v. Harrison, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 
1385–86 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) applies only to courts of 
appeals); United States v. Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The 
structure, language, and placement of section 3145(c) all favor the view that a 
district court is not invested with the power to reach ‘exceptional reasons.’ ”); United 
States v. Nesser, 937 F. Supp. 507, 509 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that “Congress 
reserved” § 3145(c) to courts of appeals only); United States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 
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courts apply proper statutory interpretation principles and start 
by noting 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)’s title indicates that it deals with 
appeals.242  Moreover, according to them, the language contained 
in § 3145(c) unambiguously applies to appellate courts.243  And 
finally, they note “that the overall structure of § 3145” supports 
the notion that it does not apply to district courts.244
3. Inconsistent Application of Federal Law 
   
District courts in the Eleventh Circuit, a circuit with no 
binding authority on whether district courts may apply 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3145(c), have taken divergent views, thus causing an 
inconsistent application of federal law.  Three district courts 
within the Eleventh Circuit have concluded that they may resort 
to the “exceptional reasons” provision in deciding whether a 
criminal may receive bail.245  But another district court within 
the Eleventh Circuit disagrees, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) 
applies only to courts of appeals.246
And from 2002 until March 2010, when the Sixth Circuit 
issued a binding decisions, district courts within the Sixth 
Circuit were also applying 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) inconsistently.
   
247
 
648, 652 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that the court of appeals’ decisions “ignore certain 
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation” and that it had “no authority 
pursuant to § 3145(c) to determine whether there are ‘exceptional reasons’ that 
make defendant’s detention inappropriate”).  
  
242 See, e.g., Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (“As a preliminary matter, Section 
3145(c) is titled ‘[a]ppeal from a release or detention order . . . .’ ” (alteration in 
original)); Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (“The title of the subsection (‘appeal from a 
release or detention order’) and the use of the word ‘appeal’ in place of ‘review’ weigh 
heavily in favor of reading § 3145(c) to apply only to appellate courts.”).   
243 See, e.g., Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 937–38 (assaying the text of 3145(c)); 
Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (“[T]he language of the sentence in included in 
§ 3145(c) is direct.”); Salome, 870 F. Supp. at 652 (stating that the first sentence of 
§ 3145(c) plainly reveals that it applies to appellate courts). 
244 See, e.g., Chen, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (noting that the “structure of section 
3145 compels the conclusion that a district court may not consider ‘exceptional 
reasons’ as a basis for release”); Salome, 870 F. Supp. at 652 (“[T]he overall 
structure of § 3145 belies the argument that § 3145(c) should be applied by a district 
court.”). 
245 See United States v. Hooks, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 
(considering a criminal’s motion for bail under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)); United States v. 
Bryant, 873 F. Supp. 660, 662–63 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (same); United States v. Pope, 794 
F. Supp. 372, 373 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (same).   
246 Harrison, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1385–86 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) 
applies only to courts of appeals).  
247 Until March 2010, when the Sixth Circuit issued a published order, district 
courts within the Sixth Circuit were free to disregard the Sixth Circuit’s 
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Some district courts had concluded that they may use 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).248  Other district courts, by contrast, had 
concluded that they could not.249
CONCLUSION  
   
Section 3145(c)’s unambiguous text confines its application 
to courts of appeals only.  District courts may not resort to it, and 
its concomitant injection of broad discretion, because Congress 
reserved its usage to courts of appeals.  Moreover, though resort 
to legislative history is unnecessary, that legislative history 
evinces congressional desire to limit § 3145(c) to the “appeals 
setting.”250  In addition, the entire arc of legislative history for 
the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Bail Reform Act of 1984, and the 
Mandatory Detention Act of 1990 was to limit, not augment, 
courts’ discretion.251
The Article notes, however, that Congress could amend 
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to allow for district court usage.  Sensible 
reasons exist for Congress to amend § 3145(c) to allow district 
courts the discretion of granting bail if truly “exceptional 
reasons” exist.  For instance, suppose a convicted person in a 
 
 
pronouncement that they are “not precluded from making a determination of 
exceptional circumstances in support of release,” United States v. Cook, 42 F. App’x 
803, 804 (6th Cir. 2002), because unpublished cases are not binding precedent in the 
Sixth Circuit. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002). In March 
2010, as mentioned above, the Sixth Circuit “h[e]ld that the district court erred in 
not considering whether Christman established exceptional reasons to support his 
release pending sentencing.” United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870, 871 (6th Cir. 
2010) (order reversing authorization of detention pending sentencing). 
248 See United States v. Miller, 568 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (holding 
that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to consider defendant’s request for 
release pending sentencing based upon the “exceptional reasons” provision because 
the text was ambiguous and the legislative history supported application by district 
courts); United States v. Salazar, 3:06CR-112-H, 2007 WL 542390, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. 
Feb. 16, 2007) (applying § 3145(c)); United States v. Burnett, 76 F. Supp. 2d 846, 
848–50 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (same); United States v. Rodriguez, 50 F. Supp. 2d 717, 
721 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (same).  
249 See United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(holding that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3145 established that it applies only 
to appeals); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“In 
the end, the most natural reading of the text, structure, and context of section 
3145(c) leads to the conclusion that Congress grants authority to find ‘exceptional 
reasons’ only to appellate courts.”); In re Sealed Case, 242 F. Supp. 2d 489, 491–92 
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (same).  
250 See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.  
251 See supra Part II.B–D and accompanying text.  
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terrorism case pledges to cooperate proactively with the 
government pending sentencing.  Presumably,  Congress would 
want district courts to have the flexibility of granting bail, letting 
the government accumulate as much information from the 
convicted criminal as possible.252
But that day has not arrived.  The extant version of § 3145(c) 
applies only to courts of appeals.  This Article concludes by 
reciting one district court’s apt conclusion on this situation:  “[A] 
judge’s wish . . . that an act of Congress provide more flexibility, 
is simply not a sufficient ground to abandon reliance on the 
words of the statute itself.”
  This Article thereby urges 
Congress to consider amending 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) to allow 
district courts to grant bail in very specific circumstances that 
Congress deems appropriate. 
253  Federal courts cannot violate 
bedrock separation-of-powers principles by disregarding clear 
congressional mandates and replacing them with their own 
preferences of what the mandates should mean.254
 
 
 
252 At least two members of Congress have expressed their desire to prevent 
appellate courts from using the “exceptional reasons” provision in terrorism cases. 
As mentioned above, a bill in Congress would add subsection (d) to 18 U.S.C. § 3145. 
In September 2009, Senators Jon Kyl and John Cornyn sponsored the “USA 
PATRIOT Reauthorization and Additional Weapons Against Terrorism Act of 2009.” 
S. 1726, 111th Cong. (2009). Title III of this proposed bill, entitled “Additional 
Government Weapons Against Terrorism Act of 2009,” would amend 
18 U.S.C. § 3145 by adding subsection (d). Id. § 301. Subsection (d) would remove the 
appellate courts’ ability to use the “exceptional reasons” provision in cases involving 
convicted terrorists and sex offenders. See supra note 40.   
253 United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957–58 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
254 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(stating that federal courts’ power is limited, constrained by the Constitution and 
federal statutes).  
